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INTRODUCTION 
On December 4, 2003, a Michigan state legislator introduced an 
amendment to the state constitution that would give the legislature 
authority to determine how public universities can spend their 
appropriated money.1  Michigan, a state whose constitution serves as 
the model for many other states regarding higher education,2 has the 
most autonomous public higher education system in the country.3  
                                                          
 1. See H.J. Res. R, 2003 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2003) (providing “for legislative 
oversight of institutions of higher education”), available at http://www.michigan-
legislature.org/documents/2003-2004/jointresolutionintroduced/house/pdf/2003-
HIJR-R.pdf.  The amendment requires a two-thirds vote in both chambers before it 
reaches Michigan voters.  See Judy Putnam, Power Play:   Official Seeks Control in School 
Affairs, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Dec. 7, 2003, at A27 (pointing out that the amendment, 
once adopted, would allow the legislature to create laws controlling university 
spending). 
 2. See David Aronofsky, Voters Wisely Reject Proposed Constitutional Amendment 30 to 
Eliminate Montana Board of Regents, 58 MONT. L. REV. 333, 338, 342 (1997) (noting 
that Montana and “a number of other states adopted the Michigan constitutional 
autonomy model”). 
 3. See id. at 338 n.16 (recognizing that Michigan is at the forefront of states with 
regard to the level of autonomy given to institutions of higher learning); see also id. at 
341-42 (asserting that the Michigan Supreme Court continuously defends Michigan’s 
public university autonomy from State encroachment and mentioning that 
Michigan’s constitution requires the popular election of the university boards to 
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Constitutionally separate from the executive and legislative branches 
of government, Michigan universities have enjoyed a long history of 
independence from governmental influence4 and consider the 
amendment a real threat.5 
Representative Jack Hoogendyk, a rookie Republican legislator 
named “most conservative” House member in 2003,6 is the primary 
sponsor of both this amendment7 as well as an earlier resolution 
endangering university autonomy by giving the legislature more 
university oversight.8  The earlier resolution came in response to 
more than sixty university courses Representative Hoogendyk believes 
deserve greater scrutiny, covering such topics as homosexuality, 
gender, and diversity.9  Within the past two years, legislatures in 
                                                          
further shield the universities from political influence). 
 4. The Michigan legislature may decide how much money it appropriates to 
public universities.  See MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 4.  The state constitution, however, 
allows the university boards of trustees to decide how to spend the money.  See § 5 
(“Each board shall have general supervision of its institution and the control and 
direction of all expenditures from the institution’s funds.”); see also Putnam, supra 
note 1, at A27 (quoting University of Michigan President Mary Sue Coleman, who 
pointed out that Michigan “universities have been the envy of many across the 
country”). 
 5. See Putnam, supra note 1, at A27 (quoting Mike Boulus, executive director of 
the Presidents Council, State Universities of Michigan, who claimed that the 
amendment may diminish autonomy and, therefore, hinder the development of 
universities).  The Amendment would end university independence.  Not only could 
the legislature make course funding conditional, but it could also require universities 
to give a detailed account of their internal decision-making.  See Lawmakers Unwisely 
Grab for Power Over State Colleges, DETROIT NEWS, Dec. 19, 2003, at http://www.detne-
ws.com/2003/editorial/0312/21/a14-13016.htm (on file with the American 
University Law Review).  By losing independence, universities will struggle to explore 
unpopular societal issues without political interference.  Id.  In fact, this fear of 
political sway is what originally prompted most state legislatures to create, through 
their constitutions, an autonomous university system. See Aronofsky, supra note 2, at 
341. 
 6. See News Release, House Republican Communications Services, Hoogendyk 
named most conservative House member (Sept. 23, 2003) (explaining that 
Hoogendyk’s roll call voting score was a “perfect conservative rating” and that to 
Hoogendyk, “a conservative is someone who fights for smaller government and the 
protection of traditional values”), at http://www.gophouse.com/Members/HOOG-
ENDYK/Releases/Releases/09_23_03_conservative_member.htm (on file with the 
American University Law Review). 
 7. Putnam, supra note 1, at A27. 
 8. See H. Res. 141, 2003 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2003) (urging “Michigan’s 
public universities to reexamine all class offerings and refrain from offering classes 
or university-sanctioned activities that promote or facilitate participation in a sexual 
lifestyle or practices other than heterosexual monogamy”), available at 
http://www.michiganlegislature.org/documents/2003-2004/journal/house/htm/2-
003-HJ-10-14-074.htm.  HR 141 is now in the Committee on Higher Education.  Id. 
 9. Representative Hoogendyk targeted courses such as Central Michigan 
University’s “Society and Sex,” “Women, Crime and Deviance,” “The Family,” and 
“Discrimination:   Roots and Impact on Children’s Development.”  See Tiffany L. 
Woods, CMU Officials Defend Classes on ‘Hit List,’ CENT. MICH. LIFE, Sept. 29, 2003, at 
http://www.cm-life.com/vnews/display.v/ART/2003/09/29/3f77bc33c0d79 (on file 
with the American University Law Review).  Other classes Hoogendyk is more closely 
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North Carolina,10 Kansas,11 and Missouri12 have also attempted to gain 
greater control over curriculum decisions by withdrawing funding 
from universities for non-compliance with legislators’ views of what 
constitutes appropriate university course topics.  Currently, the 
federal government is even taking steps to assert greater control over 
curricula in higher education international studies programs.13  
                                                          
examining include “Studies in Film and Gender,” “History of Sexuality Since the 
18th Century,” “The Individual, Marriage and the Family,” and “Lesbian, Bisexual, 
and Gay Studies:   Psychological and Cultural Issues.”  See Brian Charlton, Rep. Works 
to Restrict Sexuality Curriculum, STATE NEWS, Aug. 26, 2003, at 
http://www.statenews.com/article.phtml?pk=18602 (on file with the American 
University Law Review). 
 10. In 2002, the North Carolina legislature attempted to amend the state budget 
bill to deny funding for “any course or summer reading program in any religion 
unless all other known religions are offered in an equal or incremental way” in 
response to the suggested summer reading of Michael Sells’s “Approaching the 
Qur’an” for incoming freshmen to UNC.  However, students were not compelled to 
read the book and there was no penalty for failing to complete the reading 
assignment.  See North Carolina House Budget Resolution § 9.5A (2002), available at 
http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/Sessions/2001/Bills/Senate/HTML/S1115v5.html; see 
also Summer Reading Causes Controversy at UNC, USA TODAY, Aug. 16, 2002, available at 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2002-08-16-unc-reading_x.htm. Three 
unnamed freshmen at the University brought a suit against UNC in federal court 
arguing that the assignment of the book violated the separation of church and state.  
See Yacovelli v. Moffit, No. 1:02CV596, 2004 WL 1144183, at *15 (M.D.N.C. May 20, 
2004) (denying an injunction and holding that a state university providing the 
option for students to discuss the culture of a religious group is not a violation of the 
Establishment Clause). 
 11. In 2003, a Kansas representative presented a proviso withholding funding 
from university departments that buy or use “obscene” materials and specifically 
sought to cut more than $3.1 million from the University of Kansas for allowing a 
professor to use sexually explicit materials in his sexual education class.  The 
Governor vetoed the provision as “an inappropriate use of legislative powers 
designed to impinge upon academic freedom.”  See Kansas Governor Vetoes Amendment 
Attacking Course Content, AAUP STATE LEGISLATIVE AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS (2003), at 
http://www.aaup.org/govrel/States/statindx.htm (on file with the American 
University Law Review).  As a compromise, the legislature instead passed a bill 
requiring universities to create and publicize policies dealing with sexually explicit 
materials used in the curriculum.  The new bill prohibits legislative oversight of the 
universities’ policies, thus leaving the curriculum decisions in the hands of the 
universities.  See Chris Moon, Universities Could See Policy Changes Regarding Sexually 
Explicit Materials, CAPITAL-JOURNAL ONLINE, May 5, 2003, at http://www. 
cjonline.com/stories/050303/leg_sex.shtml (on file with the American University 
Law Review). 
 12. In 2002, the Missouri legislature voted to cut $100,000 from the University of 
Missouri-Kansas City’s budget for the institution’s support of a political science 
professor who wrote an article about sexual politics and pedophilia.  In addition, the 
legislature cut $50,000 (reduced from an initial proposal to cut $5 million) in 
response to a university-run television station policy prohibiting on-air personalities 
from wearing symbols supporting a political, religious, etc. cause.  See Mark F. Smith, 
Improper Activities, ACADEME, Nov.-Dec. 2002, available at http://www.aaup.org/ 
publications/Academe/2002/02nd/02ndgr.htm. 
 13. See Milan Gagnon et al., Uncle Sam Goes to Class:   Controversial Higher Education 
Bill Toes the Line of Censorship and Academic Freedom, GOLDEN GATE XPRESS ONLINE, 
Dec. 15, 2003 (explaining that HR 3077 seeks to create an advisory board to oversee 
federally funded international studies and foreign language programs to “better 
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These actions are unusual because, historically, many state 
legislatures have played no role in curriculum decisions in higher 
education.14 
This Comment examines the legal implications of state legislatures 
controlling university curricula.  Part I looks at the legislative 
arguments in favor of these provisions which rely on the notion that 
states create and taxpayers fund public universities, meaning that the 
First Amendment applies differently than in the traditional context, 
which presumably allows governments to make judgments based on 
content.  Part I also discusses Supreme Court and other federal cases 
that show why universities are distinguishable from other government 
created institutions, thus rendering the legislatures’ arguments 
weaker.  Part II looks at the protection the First Amendment provides 
for three primary university “actors,” namely professors, students, and 
the university itself.15  This section concludes that there is likely a First 
Amendment academic freedom protecting universities’ curriculum 
decisions.  Part III examines some arguments universities could make 
if they do have a right to challenge the actions of the legislatures and 
recommends that courts should recognize the fact that curriculum 
decisions are best left to the universities.  This Comment concludes 
that the arguments in favor of legislative oversight are not applicable 
in matters of university curriculum decisions because universities are 
different from other publicly-funded institutions.  As a result, these 
                                                          
meet America’s national and international security needs” and to “ensure 
appropriate use of taxpayer funds”), at http://xpress.sfsu.edu/archives/news/-
000496.html. 
 14. See Mary Burgan, Academic Freedom in a World of Moral Crises, CHRON. HIGHER 
EDUC., Sept. 6, 2002, at B20 (“Ever since the founding of most land-grant 
institutions . . . state legislatures have refrained from using state dollars to encourage 
or inhibit the teaching or discussion of certain ideas on individual campuses.”), 
available at http://www.aaup.org/statements/archives/Speeches/2002/02MABop. 
htm. 
 15. Regarding legislative interference with university curriculum decisions, there 
is no case law directly on point.  See David M. Rabban, A Functional Analysis of 
“Individual” and “Institutional” Academic Freedom Under the First Amendment, 53 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 227, 272-73 (1990).  Rather, scholars and cases discuss professors’ 
First Amendment rights against universities and other public officials.  See, e.g., 
Michael A. Olivas, Reflections on Professorial Academic Freedom:   Second Thoughts on the 
Third “Essential Freedom”, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1835, 1837 (1993) (“[Academic freedom] 
protects quite expansively the scholarly enterprise from outside interference (grand 
juries, witch-hunting public officials, funding agencies, and other assorted patrons, 
critics, and ‘do-gooders’), but only grants limited protection to professors’ 
intramural speech or classroom activities against institutional interests.”); see also 
ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE:   1940 STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES AND 1970 
INTERPRETIVE COMMENTS, reprinted in AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY 
PROFESSORS (AAUP), POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS 3 (6th ed. 1989) (defining 
academic freedom as including three components, all of which concern the 
academic freedom of university professors and not the institution); discussion infra 
Part II.C. 
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bodies should be afforded the academic freedom to make curriculum 
decisions without legislative interference. 
I. ALTHOUGH STATE-CREATED AND TAXPAYER-FUNDED, UNIVERSITIES 
ARE DIFFERENT FROM OTHER PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS 
The creation and maintenance of schooling is in the hands of the 
states.16  While states have traditionally17 left higher education 
curriculum choices to the universities and professors,18 the largest 
sources of financial support for universities are state governments,19 
which create universities, like other government institutions, to 
achieve certain goals and functions.20  Section A discusses why this 
state allocation of funding provided by taxpayers may subject 
universities to the applicable rules for government-funded 
institutions which would give legislatures authority to control higher 
education curricula.  Section B, however, explains that the Supreme 
                                                          
 16. See Kevin G. Welner, Locking Up the Marketplace of Ideas and Locking Out School 
Reform:   Courts’ Imprudent Treatment of Controversial Teaching in America’s Public Schools, 
50 UCLA L. REV. 959, 994 (2003) (pointing out that although schools are made up of 
“an amalgam of federal, state, and local governmental actors,” the federal 
government typically plays a limited role “in the administration and control of 
schooling”); see also U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the 
States respectively, or to the people.”). 
 17. University autonomy was strongest following the McCarthy era.  See Rebecca 
Gose Lynch, Pawns of the State or Priests of Democracy?  Analyzing Professors’ Academic 
Freedom Rights Within the State’s Managerial Realm, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1061, 1067-71 (2003) 
(explaining that McCarthyism spawned courts’ use of academic freedom as a 
protection for professor speech); see also William G. Buss, Academic Freedom and 
Freedom of Speech:   Communicating the Curriculum, 2 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 213, 222 
(1999) (identifying the McCarthy-era mistreatment of teachers to include loyalty 
oaths, penalties for Communist party or other suspect organization membership, and 
in depth investigation by governmental committees). 
 18. See Burgan, supra note 14; Rabban, supra note 15, at 280 (noting that in the 
post-McCarthy era, universities have decided key issues without direct government 
interference).  See generally Walter P. Metzger, Profession and Constitution:   Two 
Definitions of Academic Freedom in America, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1265, 1286 (1988) 
(suggesting that the newfound legal protection came from “the lack of a promising 
legal theory by which to bring a violation of academic freedom . . . under the stern 
‘shall nots’ of the Constitution”).  Along with common law protection, many states 
also granted constitutional autonomy to universities.  See infra note 47. 
 19. See Valerie Brown, A Comparative Analysis of College Autonomy in Selected States, 
60 ED. LAW REP. 299, 300 (1990) (recognizing that because public universities receive 
financial support from the government and were created to serve a public purpose, 
there must be a balancing of academic autonomy and public accountability); see also 
discussion and accompanying notes infra Part I.A. 
 20. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330-34 (2003) (identifying the 
development of future leaders as an important function of public higher education).  
See generally Brown, supra note 19 (providing specific examples of state initiatives 
aimed to improve university management and discussing the results of such 
initiatives). 
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Court views universities differently from other government-created 
entities and concludes that the rules likely do not apply. 
A. Legislatures’ Arguments for Control of Curricula 
The most common argument in support of legislative oversight of 
university curricula is that taxpayers may oppose certain courses on 
religious or moral grounds,21 and therefore, it is the duty of the 
legislature to act on taxpayers’ behalves22 in order to ensure that 
universities use the appropriated money on education as opposed to 
advocacy.23  The National Center for Education Statistics reports that 
more than half of public university funding come directly from 
federal, state and local taxpayers.24  Taxpayers also provide much of 
the tuition, as about sixty percent of undergraduates receive financial 
aid.25  Representative Jack Hoogendyk, who sponsored the Michigan 
constitutional amendment, argues that in response to the University 
of Michigan class “How to be Gay:  Male Homosexuality and 
Initiation,”26 “[i]t’s time to put our foot down and say ‘not with my tax 
dollars.’”27  In addition, state legislatures are currently attempting to 
                                                          
 21. See 135 CONG. REC. S8088 (daily ed. July 26, 1989) (statement of Sen. Jesse 
Helms) (“Americans for the most part are moral, decent people and they have the 
right not to be denigrated, offended, or mocked with their own tax dollars.”). 
 22. See Sterling v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 68 N.W. 253, 255 (Mich. 1896) 
(“The argument by which legislatures have hitherto convinced themselves that it was 
their duty to legislate universities to death is this:   ‘It is a state institution, and we are 
the direct representatives of the people, and therefore it is expected of us; it is our 
right.  The people have an interest in this thing, and we must attend to it.’”).  
Disagreeing with this argument, the Sterling court held that the state legislature was 
without power to legislate in matters of university management.  Id. at 258. 
 23. See George Archibald, ‘How to be Gay’ Course Draws Fire at Michigan, WASH. 
TIMES, Aug. 18, 2003 (discussing family-values lobbyist Gary Glenn, who argues that 
University of Michigan professor David M. Halperin and the university “are guilty of 
perpetrating a fraud against UM students and the people of Michigan [with] 
propaganda statements about so-called cultural studies and academic freedom” and 
that they advocate “queer studies” using tax dollars), available at http:// 
washingtontimes.com/national/20030818-122317-3268r.htm. 
 24. See Neal McCluskey, Taxation U., NAT’L REV. ONLINE, Nov. 4, 2003 (stating 
that only 18.5% of public university revenue comes from tuition and other student 
fees), at www.nationalreview.com/nrof_comment/mccluskey200311040825.asp (on 
file with the American University Law Review).  In addition, McCluskey says that 
taxpayers also provide 16.4% of private college funds (about $12 billion).  Id. 
 25. See id. (observing that in 2002, university students received more than $40 
billion worth of grants from federal and state governments and universities in 
addition to government provided loans). 
 26. Representative Hoogendyk refers to this class as the case in point of the 
“militant, gay/lesbian/transgender/bisexual agenda.”  See Peter Luke, Culture Wars in 
Michigan Get Some Fuel, DECLARATION FOUND. (Sept. 2, 2003), at http://www. 
declaration.net/news.asp?docID=3658&y=2003 (on file with the American University 
Law Review). 
 27. Id.  Taxpayers, however, likely do not have standing to complain about 
curricula they do not agree with.  In Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429 
(1952), the Court looked at whether a state taxpayer (the parent of a public school 
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participate more closely in public university decision-making because 
of financial strains and the resultant pressures for stronger 
accountability by taxpayers and tuition-paying students.28 
Legislatures also argue that, because the state funds universities, 
legislatures have full authority to decide, and thereby regulate, what 
courses universities, which are merely “speaking” for the state, can 
offer.29  As a result, legislatures argue, states may make content-based 
funding decisions to encourage activities that the legislature deems to 
be in the public interest.30  Therefore, the First Amendment applies 
differently to government institutions, such as public universities,31 
than to public discourse by individuals where content-based 
censorship is generally forbidden.32 
                                                          
student) had standing to contest a state statute that required the reading of the Bible 
at the opening of every public school day.  Id. at 432-33.  The Court found that “the 
grievance which it is sought to litigate here is not a direct dollars-and-cents injury but 
is a religious difference” and therefore the requisite injury was lacking.  Id. at 434-35. 
 28. See John Buntin, Setting Colleges Free, GOVERNING, Sept. 2003, at 18, 19 
(describing how state legislators are frustrated because they do not know what public 
university students are learning).  “In the last fiscal year, state and local governments 
in the United States spent $66 billion on higher education, but policy makers who 
start asking questions about what governments get for their investment soon make a 
startling discovery:   No one really knows.”  Id.  As a result, some state legislatures are 
basing funding on performance, but often the performance tests are arbitrary and 
political.  Id. at 20.  In addition, it is rare indeed when a student graduates in four 
years.  For example, a 1996 survey found that just thirty-four percent of public 
university students finish in four years.  See Kate O’Beirne, The Six-Year Plan, NAT’L 
REV. ONLINE, Apr. 22, 2002, (discussing the increasing trend for students at public 
universities to take five or six years to obtain their degrees), at http://www.national 
review.com/flashback/flashback-kob051002.asp (on file with the American 
University Law Review). 
 29. “Who pays the piper calls the tune.”  This proverb seems to justify the recent 
actions by state legislatures to gain greater control over higher education curriculum 
by conditioning funding.  See Martin D. Snyder, A Question of Autonomy:   The View from 
Salzburg, ACADEME, May-June 2002 (questioning how universities competing for 
scarce financial resources can also preserve their autonomy), available at 
http://www.aaup.org/publications/Academe/2002/02mj/02mjsny.htm). 
 30. See Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 164 (1996) (“[T]he 
state can regulate speech within public educational institutions so as to achieve the 
purposes of education.”); see also Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) 
(explaining that the state is not obligated to fund alternative activities). 
 31. See Post, supra note 30, at 164.  Courts suggest that “[r]estrictions on speech 
by public employees in their capacity as employees are analogous to restrictions on 
government funded speech.”  See Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 408 n.6 (4th Cir. 
2000).  In each situation, the government is entitled to monitor and control the 
content of the speech because it has “purchased” the speech.  See Post, supra note 30, 
at 164. 
 32. See Robert Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake:   Individual Autonomy and the Reform of 
Public Disclosure, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1128 (1993) (“Public discourse merits 
unique constitutional protection because it is the process through which the 
democratic ‘self,’ the agent of self-government, is itself constituted through the 
reconciliation of individual and collective autonomy.”). 
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In addition, the state is a significant participant in the “market-
place of ideas.”33  On many occasions states are speaking; on other 
occasions, states subsidize or fund speech devoid of the assertion that 
the funded speech is the states’ message.34  Traditionally, states and 
local governments have had ultimate control of the curriculum in 
elementary and secondary (“K-12”) schools.35  One justification for 
state and local government control is the belief that K-12 schools are 
the inculcators of social values,36 and case law repeatedly reinforces 
this notion.37  In elementary and secondary education, curriculum 
guidelines are generally narrow because administrators and local 
government officials consider curricula to be state-sponsored 
speech.38  Legislatures argue that K-12 and higher education are 
indistinguishable in that both public institutions are speaking on 
                                                          
 33. See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1927) (recognizing that 
the classroom should foster exposure to a diversity of ideas, thereby enriching the 
learning experience). 
 34. See JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:   CASES, COMMENTS, 
QUESTIONS 877 (9th ed. 2001) (noting that the government may financially support 
artistic or scientific speech in a manner where there is no claim that the resulting 
message represents the government). 
 35. See id. (explaining that authority is usually in the hands of local school 
districts or boards of education, which then delegate some authority to individual 
schools); see also Epperson v. Ark., 393 U.S. 97, 106-08 (1968) (reiterating that a state 
legislature has an “undoubted right to prescribe the curriculum for its public 
schools” in K-12). 
 36. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979) (explaining that courts, 
citizens, and social scientists perceive public education as “inculcating fundamental 
values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system”).  Some 
scholars insist that these “fundamental values” include the availability of information 
so students are exposed to diverse ideas.  See generally Susan H. Bitensky, A 
Contemporary Proposal for Reconciling the Free Speech Clause with Curricular Values 
Inculcation in the Public Schools, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 769, 770-72 (1995) (positing 
that, in reality, there are two approaches in K-12:   inculcative, where specific values 
are identified and taught to students, and noninculcative, where the focus is on 
“reasoning about values while avoiding the transmission of any definite moral 
statement”). 
 37. See Bitensky, supra note 36, at 797 (suggesting that “to inculcate or not to 
inculcate” has never been a question as the Court has repeatedly been receptive to 
values inculcation at the K-12 level); see, e.g., Ambach, 441 U.S. at 78-79 (finding that a 
New York statute forbidding public school employment to aliens was constitutionally 
valid because New York had a legitimate interest in advancing students’ “perceptions 
and values” and shaping “the attitudes of students toward government, the political 
process, and a citizen’s social responsibilities”); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 
510, 534 (1925) (“No question is raised concerning the power of the State reasonably 
to regulate all schools, . . . to require . . . that teachers shall be of good moral 
character and patriotic disposition, [and] that certain studies plainly essential to 
good citizenship must be taught.”); see also Ambach, 441 U.S. at 86 n.6 (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he inculcation of fundamental values by our public schools is 
necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system.”). 
 38. See discussion and accompanying notes infra Part I.B.2 (discussing case law 
holding that curriculum control at the K-12 level is permissible if aimed at speech 
that is state-sponsored). 
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behalf of the state and, therefore, curriculum control is necessary in 
higher education.39 
In addition, governments do not have a duty to provide financial 
support to foster free speech.40  One Michigan representative equates 
the debate over control of state-funded university courses to the 
controversy over state-funded abortion, which enjoys no 
constitutional right to state funding.41  In other words, because there 
is no constitutional entitlement to government funding for 
universities,42 there is no violation of a right if legislatures refuse to 
fund a certain class.43  Furthermore, operating under the premise that 
tuition is “real” private money and not public tax money, legislatures 
imply that tuition, rather than state funds, would pay for universities 
that offer controversial courses.44  Finally, legislatures argue that they 
                                                          
 39. See supra notes 1, 8, 10-12 and accompanying text. 
 40. See Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 542 n.1, 
550-51 (1983) (holding that although charitable contributions are free speech 
activities, the government could classify contributions to veteran’s organizations 
engaged in lobbying as deductible but could deny deductions for contributions 
made to other organizations (religious, educational, charitable, scientific) if they 
engaged in lobbying activities); see also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 191, 203 (1991) 
(upholding regulations limiting the beneficiaries of government family planning 
service grants from offering services related to abortion). 
 41. Ted Roelofs, Bill Puts College Classes in the Hot Seat, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Aug. 
22, 2003, at A1. 
 42. Most public universities are entirely state created. 
 43. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 310, 322-23 (1980) (finding that 
although the choice to have an abortion is a constitutionally protected right, it does 
not follow that the government is bound to provide the financial resources for an 
abortion); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1977) (upholding a government 
program that funded childbirth but denied funding for non-therapeutic abortions 
and noting that the government may choose to favor childbirth over abortion and, if 
so, allocate public funds accordingly).  Similarly, state legislatures argue that there is 
nothing constitutionally wrong with legislatures making university funding 
conditional upon the universities conforming their curriculum to what legislators 
deem to be in the public interest.  See, e.g., Charlton, supra note 9 (explaining that 
the Michigan Constitution gives the state legislature discretion regarding how much 
state funds to allocate to public universities and discussing Rep. Hoogendyk’s 
proposed constitutional amendment which would enable the legislature to refuse to 
fund courses it deems to be inappropriate for higher education and to withhold 
funding from public universities that refuse to submit detailed course descriptions 
for review by the legislature).  But see J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom:   A “Special 
Concern of the First Amendment,” 99 YALE L.J. 251, 328 (1989) (“Even attempts by the 
legislature to tie substantive conditions to specific appropriations have been set aside 
when found to interfere with general operations of the university.”). 
 44. See Charlton, supra note 9 (discussing the sentiments of legislatures that 
taxpayers are concerned with the allocation of tax dollars to universities that offer 
nontraditional courses).  Not including room and board, books, etc., in 2003, the 
average tuition at a four-year public university was more than $4,000, and more than 
$18,000 at a private university.  See REPRESENTATIVE JOHN A. BOEHNER AND 
REPRESENTATIVE HOWARD P. MCKEON, THE COLLEGE COST CRISIS:   A CONGRESSIONAL 
ANALYSIS OF COLLEGE COSTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR AMERICA’S HIGHER EDUCATION 
SYSTEM, at 1-2, 6 (Sept. 4, 2003) (emphasizing that Americans think higher education 
is not accountable enough to the “consumers of higher education:”  parents, 
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have a duty to take action when an offered course violates the 
Establishment Clause45 or uses obscene material.46 
B. The Traditional Arguments for State Control Are Distinguishable 
Some scholars argue that when states have constitutions that 
establish public universities as a separate branch of government,47 this 
automatically prohibits legislative efforts to take part in internal 
academic affairs.48  University autonomy in governance stems from 
                                                          
students and taxpayers).  This argument quickly fails, however, because the state 
does not require students to attend a specific school or enroll in a specific class; 
rather it is left to the parents and students to decide where to attend and which 
courses to take.  See Mark J. Fiore, Trampling the “Marketplace of Ideas”:   The Case 
Against Extending Hazelwood to College Campuses, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1915, 1955-58 
(2002) (explaining that university students possess much more freedom than K-12 
students, whose education is compulsory); see also Jonathan R. Alger, From Father to 
Big Brother:   Applying K-12 Law to Colleges, ACADEME, Jan.-Feb. 1999 (pointing out that 
prospective students decide whether or not to enroll in a university and where to do 
so), available at http://www.aaup.org/publications/Academe/1999/99jf/LW_JF99. 
HTM. 
 45. See North Carolina example supra note 10. 
 46. See Kansas example supra note 11; see also Scott Rothschild, Senator Broadens 
Attack on Professor, LAWRENCE JOURNAL-WORLD, May 3, 2003 (asserting that Kansas 
Senator Susan Wagle believed that a University of Kansas professor used obscene 
videos and language in his class “Human Sexuality in Everyday Life”), available at 
http://www.ljworld.com/section/kusexclass/storypr/130597.  Senator Wagle then 
attempted to cut $3.1 million in funding from University of Kansas’ School of Social 
Welfare on the grounds that the professor used obscene videos in his class “Human 
Sexuality in Everyday Life.”  Id.  The state can punish obscene speech because it has 
no communicative value and it may restrict speech having a clear and present danger 
of imminent disturbance.  See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18-19, 24 (1973) 
(finding that in determining whether material is obscene, courts must ask whether 
“the average person, applying contemporary community standards” would find that 
the material:   (1) appeals to the prurient interest; (2) offensively depicts statutorily 
defined sexual conduct; and (3) “lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific 
value”).  Obviously if the curriculum used obscene material, the courses and 
materials are likely to be excluded.  However, most universities have detailed 
curriculum review procedures already in place to address these potential issues.  See, 
e.g., Marisa Kwiatkowski, Pseudo University Board of Trustees, 38 GRAND VALLEY 
LANTHORN 7 (2003) (writing that Michigan’s Grand Valley State University has a 
complex course review system, and that “[i]f a course was really that bad, it would not 
make it through all of [the] stages”), available at http://www. 
lanthorn.com/archives.asp?aid=2846; Charlton, supra note 9 (discussing Michigan 
State University Trustee David Porteous’ view that MSU’s review process “works 
pretty well and has withstood the test of time”). 
 47. Several state constitutional provisions give public universities an independent 
legal status.  See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. XIV, § 264; CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 9; GA. CONST. 
art. VIII, § 4; HAW. CONST. art. X, § 6; IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 10; LA. CONST. art. VIII, 
§§ 5-7; MICH. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 4, 5; MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 3; MONT. CONST. art. 
X, § 9; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 10; NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 4; OKLA. CONST. art. XIII, § 8.  
However, other state statutes limit autonomy.  See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 12; 
MO. CONST. art. IX; N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 13; S.D. CONST. art. XIV, § 3; UTAH 
CONST. art. X, § 4. 
 48. As mentioned in the Introduction, because the Michigan Constitution and 
common law mandate public university independence, the legislature is left with 
amending the constitution to take part in curriculum decisions.  See Rabban, supra 
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state constitutions,49 cases,50 and tradition.51  Even accepting the 
constitutional autonomy argument as true, it is still not clear whether 
universities in states that do not provide for autonomy52 have any 
rights against the state legislature.  This section analyzes this issue by 
contrasting universities with other government institutions, including 
secondary and elementary schools, and concludes that legislatures 
cannot treat public universities like other publicly-funded entities. 
                                                          
note 15, at 272 (noting that when state constitutions establish the public university 
system as a separate branch of government, state courts have interpreted the 
constitution to prevent state legislatures from attempting to dictate the location of 
academic departments or fix the percentage of out-of-state students); see also Byrne, 
supra note 43, at 327 (noting that in states where public universities have 
independent legal status, several state courts have struck down state statutes that 
attempt to impose legislative control over academic decision-making).  But see 
Rabban, supra note 15, at 272 (“But in the majority of states, in which no 
constitutional separation of powers exists to protect the state university, it seems 
difficult to argue that the First Amendment poses a bar to such legislative 
decisions.”). 
 49. See Brown, supra note 19, at 301-10 (indicating that many state constitutions 
establish university autonomy through governing boards (Boards of Regents, 
Trustees, etc.)).  At least twelve state constitutions guarantee autonomy for public 
universities.  See supra note 47. 
 50. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 417 So. 2d 946, 947 (Ala. 1982) (stating that 
the legislature may not eliminate the trustees’ university management discretion 
through a statute); Levi v. Univ. of Hawaii, 628 P.2d 1026, 1029 (Haw. 1981) (finding 
that regents have sole authority on internal management issues); Dreps v. Bd. of 
Regents, 139 P.2d 467, 473 (Idaho 1943) (holding that the state constitution 
prohibits the legislature from interfering in the Board of Regents’ employment 
decisions); Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Michigan, 203 N.W.2d 871, 886 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 1973) (reaffirming that the framers of the Michigan Constitution intended 
regents, acting as an independent authority, to be free from legislative interference 
in the operation of universities); King v. Bd. of Regents, 200 P.2d 221, 238 (Nev. 
1948) (stating that the legislative creation of a mandatory advisory committee to the 
regents is invalid as it infringes on the regents’ sole authority over university 
management).  But see, e.g., First Equity Corp. v. Utah State Univ., 544 P.2d 887, 889, 
892 (Utah 1975) (holding that the state university corporation exists exclusively as an 
instrument for the state governance of the university). 
 51. Creators modeled the first American universities after German institutions, 
where the concept of “lehrfreiheit” (freedom to teach and research) had utmost 
importance.  See Gail Sorenson & Andrew S. LaManque, The Application of Hazelwood 
v. Kuhlmeier in College Litigation, 22 J.C. & U.L. 971, 974-75 (1996) (pointing out that 
the concepts of “lernfreiheit” (freedom to learn) and “freiheit der wissenschaft” 
(“freedom of the academy”) were left out of the American Association of University 
Professors’ definition of academic freedom).  Rather than placing emphasis on 
character formation, the early German universities valued intellectual exploration.  
See John A. Beach, The Management and Governance of Academic Institutions, 12 J.C. & 
U.L. 301, 307-08 (1985). 
 52. See, e.g., Prince v. Bd. of Educ., 543 P.2d 1176, 1182 (N.M. 1975) 
(interpreting the New Mexico Constitution to guarantee exclusive state control over 
public schools constructed by the state on leased lands, including control of 
curriculum). 
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1. Universities, in their purpose and goals, are different from other
 governmental institutions 
Institutions of higher education are not like other governmental 
institutions, whose objectives include carrying out the desires of the 
legislative and executive branch.53  Rather, the traditional mission of 
universities is to prepare future leaders by exposing students to the 
“marketplace of ideas,”54 where critical inquiry of society and 
government is the norm.  The Supreme Court,55 academic 
organizations56 and the international community57 continue to 
reinforce the need for protecting the “robust exchange of ideas”58 
that occurs in higher education. 
Even though universities exist solely as a state creation and are 
therefore responsible for serving the public interest,59 public 
universities are vastly different from other state-created institutions.60  
                                                          
 53. See Brown, supra note 19, at 310 (emphasizing characteristics that distinguish 
universities from other governmental agencies, such as decentralized governance, 
diverse subject matter and teaching styles that vary from classroom to classroom, and 
absence of hierarchical organization). 
 54. See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (stressing the 
importance of educating students “through wide exposure to that robust exchange 
of ideas which discovers truth out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through 
any kind of authoritative selection”); see also Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819, 835 
(1995) (“[T]he State acts against a background and tradition of thought and 
experiment that is at the center of our intellectual and philosophic tradition.”). 
 55. See discussion infra Part II.A (providing examples of Supreme Court decisions 
indicating that universities are most likely entitled to First Amendment protections 
regarding curriculum decisions). 
 56. See, e.g., NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, NEA POLICY STATEMENT:   
CURRICULUM REFORM (June 1998) (explaining that university “curriculum . . . should 
be designed to prepare all students for effective citizenship and participation in an 
increasingly diverse multicultural and multiracial society”), available at 
http://www.nea.org/he/policy4.html. 
 57. The importance of academic freedom for universities has been recognized in 
several international documents.  These documents avow the significance of 
autonomy in higher education and verify the fundamental requirement that 
universities remain responsive to the needs of society.  See, e.g., LIMA DECLARATION ON 
ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND AUTONOMY OF INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION (Sept. 10, 
1988) (stating that “‘autonomy’ means the independence of the institutions of 
higher education from the State and all other forces of society, to make decisions 
regarding . . . its policies of education, research, extension work and other related 
activities”), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports98/indonesia2/Borneote-13.htm 
(on file with the American University Law Review); see also Implementation of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights:   General Comment No. 13, 
U.N. ESCOR, 21st Sess., at ¶ 38, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/10 (1999) (“The right to 
education can only be enjoyed if accompanied by the academic freedom of staff and 
students.”), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/ae1a0b126d068e8680 
25683c003c8b3b?. 
 58. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603. 
 59. See Beach, supra note 51, at 312 (arguing that ultimately, only public policy 
and the Constitution provide any limitation on state control of university 
governance). 
 60. Id. at 310-11 (pointing out that the state attorney general does not have a 
duty to represent the public university). 
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For example, unlike other state agencies having the responsibility to 
apply government established procedure and policy statewide, 
university success relies upon flexibility, individuality in scholarship, 
teaching and research, and variety in academic disciplines.61  Because 
the public interest in education is disseminating knowledge, 
discovering new information, and critically analyzing ideas, strict 
content-based regulation by state legislatures would only stifle these 
goals.62  In addition, decentralized governance and freedom from 
political interference are strong traditions in public university 
systems.63  Finally, rather than having a hierarchical organization like 
a typical state agency, a university is a “complex collegial body built 
around individual talents.”64  Because universities are different in 
structure and purpose from typical state created institutions, strong 
arguments exist that the normal rules for legislative control do not 
apply. 
2. Universities are different from elementary and secondary schools 
Not only do universities differ from other government institutions, 
but higher education is also different than K-12 education.  In 
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,65 the Supreme Court held that 
censorship of a school newspaper curriculum66 by a high school was 
                                                          
 61. Brown, supra note 19, at 310.  As with other state-funded entities, such as the 
press, public debate occurs in universities.  See, e.g., David Cole, Symposium:   Art, 
Distribution, & the State:   Perspectives in the National Endowment for the Arts, 17 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 705, 721 (1999) (discussing government subsidization of speech 
activity of organizations such as broadcast media, political organizations, advocacy 
groups, and public and private universities and noting that “every serious substantial 
aspect of free speech in this country is supported by government dollars”). 
 62. If state legislatures can restrict funding to only those courses they deem 
appropriate, there will be much less public debate in universities, which defeats a 
primary basis for the creation and existence of these institutions.  See Sweezy v. New 
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (“Teachers and students must always remain 
free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; 
otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.”).  See generally Walter P. Metzger, 
Profession and Constitution:   Two Definitions of Academic Freedom in America, 66 TEX. L. 
REV. 1265, 1272 (1988) (analyzing the history of the concept of academic freedom in 
the United States and noting that the American Association of University Professors 
has emphasized that academic freedom is an essential characteristic of a college or 
university, and “the one grace it dare[s] not lose without losing everything”). 
 63. See Aronofsky, supra note 2, at 339-45 (citing Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819), in which the Court rejected the New Hampshire 
legislature’s creation of a state overseer board for the purpose of assisting with 
campus governance).  Aronofsky points out that the Court’s concern for autonomy 
was not confined to private schools). 
 64. Brown, supra note 19, at 310. 
 65. 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
 66. Id. at 262, 271 (defining curriculum as activities “supervised by faculty 
members and designed to impart knowledge or skills to student participants and 
audiences”). 
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permissible because the regulated speech was “school sponsored.”67  
The Court found that K-12 schools may exercise “editorial control 
over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored 
expressive activities”68 as long as the regulations are “reasonably 
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”69  While several federal 
courts have extended Hazelwood to teacher speech,70 no court has yet 
applied the principle to higher education.71 
One plausible reason why courts have not extended the Hazelwood 
premise to university curriculum is that K-12 and higher education 
institutions are fundamentally different from each other.  Whereas in 
Epperson v. Arkansas72 the Court held that state legislatures have an 
“undoubted right to prescribe the curriculum for its public schools” 
in K-12,73 there is no case law supporting the same “undoubted right” 
of legislatures in higher education. 
One explanation for this difference is the age and maturity of the 
students attending the respective educational institutions.  In 
Hazelwood, the Court partly based its decision on the fact that K-12 
students are young and impressionable.74  Conversely, the Supreme 
Court has described university students as “young adults” who are 
                                                          
 67. Id. at 270-71 (holding also that schools and classrooms are not public 
forums). 
 68. Id. at 273. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See, e.g., Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 366, 368-70 
(4th Cir. 1996) (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271) (finding that a public high 
school teacher has no First Amendment right to take part in the composition of 
school curriculum by selecting and producing a play because “students, parents, and 
members of the public might reasonably perceive [the production of the play 
“Independence”] to bear the imprimatur of the school”). 
 71. See Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342, 346 n.5 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Because we find 
that a forum analysis requires that the yearbook be analyzed as a limited public 
forum — rather than a nonpublic forum — we agree with the parties that Hazelwood 
has little application to this case.”). 
 72. 393 U.S. 97 (1968). 
 73. Id. at 107 (noting, however, that this right does not allow a school to deem 
something a violation in a manner that would violate the First Amendment).  When 
the school attempted to prohibit a teacher from teaching evolution, the Court 
invalidated the school’s decision because it was solely motivated by the desire to only 
teach the Christian theory of the origin of humankind.  Id. at 107-08. 
 74. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272 (“A school must be able to take into account 
the emotional maturity of the intended audience in determining whether to 
disseminate student speech on potentially sensitive topics, which might range from 
the existence of Santa Claus in an elementary school setting to the particulars of 
teenage sexual activity in a high school setting.”); see also Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 
373, 385 (1985) (characterizing secondary and elementary school students as 
“impressionable youngsters”), overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).  
But see Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250-51 (1990) (stating that “secondary 
school students are mature enough and are likely to understand that a school does 
not endorse or support student speech that it merely permits on a nondiscriminatory 
basis”). 
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“less impressionable than younger students.”75  Moreover, states 
mandate that K-12 education is compulsory,76 creating a “captive 
audience”77 in elementary and secondary schools.  University 
students, however, have many choices; not only the choice as to 
whether or not to obtain a higher education, but also which 
university to attend, what classes to enroll in once they get there, and 
which professors to take when a particular class is taught by more 
than one instructor.78 
More importantly, the purposes behind the educational 
institutions also differ.  Whereas states typically have a strong interest 
in value inculcation and the preparation of individuals for 
participation as citizens,79 the goal of higher education is to expose 
students to new ideas and to allow for the critical questioning of these 
ideas.  For example, in Grutter v. Bollinger,80 the Court reinforced the 
importance to students of exposure to the “marketplace of ideas”81 by 
reiterating the benefits of diversity in education, the determination of 
which involves “complex educational judgments . . . primarily within 
the expertise of the university.”82  Finally, educational experts 
maintain that the curricular inclusion of controversial issues and 
                                                          
 75. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 n.14 (1981). 
 76. See, e.g., Mark G. Yudof, Three Faces of Academic Freedom, 32 LOY. L. REV. 831, 
836 (1987) (mentioning that states have drawn the line for student autonomy and 
maturity by creating public schools and imposing compulsory attendance laws at the 
K-12 level); see also Fiore, supra note 44, at 1957 (explaining that university 
attendance is not mandatory and suggesting that college and high school students 
are not comparable for First Amendment purposes). 
 77. See MARK G. YUDOF ET AL., EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW 250 (4th ed. 
2002) (pointing out that students in K-12 schools cannot avoid public school 
teachers’ expressed beliefs and values). 
 78. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584 n.5 (1987) (“The potential for 
undue influence is far less significant with regard to college students who voluntarily 
enroll in courses.”). 
 79. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (expressing 
the view that the purpose of public education is to inculcate those fundamental 
values essential to democracy, and that courts must balance First Amendment rights 
against the societal interest in teaching school children proper behavior); see also 
Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-80 (1979) (determining that a State may assume 
that all teachers have an obligation to promote civic ideals in their classrooms).  The 
Ambach Court explained “[t]he importance of public schools in the preparation of 
individuals for participation as citizens, and in the preservation of values on which 
our society rests, long has been recognized by our decisions.”  Id. at 76-77.  But see 
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511-12 (1969) (striking 
down a school’s ban on armbands used to protest the Vietnam War and warning 
courts to prevent schools from becoming “enclaves of totalitarianism” by limiting 
state control); W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (striking 
down the mandatory recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance). 
 80. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 81. In Abrams v. United States, Justice Holmes first mentioned the “marketplace of 
ideas,” finding that “the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in 
ideas.”  250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 82. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328. 
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experience with diversity promotes the development of necessary life 
skills.83 
Therefore, although universities clearly “speak” using government 
funds, public universities, unlike K-12 schools, are speaking neither 
on the government’s behalf, nor as the government’s representative 
when they establish curricula.84  For example, because K-12 schools 
“speak” more on the government’s behalf than independently,85 there 
are limitations on what the state can teach in K-12 schools because 
the state must remain neutral regarding religion and political 
controversy.86  Yet public colleges and universities are free to offer 
religious, theological, or political courses.  That universities speak less 
for the government than K-12 and other government institutions is a 
strong argument against legislatures’ ability to control university 
curriculum. 
3. The legislatures’ actions could be void for vagueness 
Although generally no constitutional right to public funding 
exists,87 the Supreme Court has suggested that this notion is 
inapplicable to public universities.  Rust v. Sullivan88 stands for the 
proposition that the state, to advocate its policies, can appropriate 
                                                          
 83. See Welner, supra note 16, at 961-62 (suggesting that such skills include 
critical thinking and interpersonal skills, as well as “skills needed for effective 
participation as a citizen in a democracy”).  In addition, public universities, but not 
public elementary or secondary schools, can offer courses on religion or theology 
without violating the Establishment Clause.  See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 271 
(1981). 
 84. See Randall P. Bezanson, Institutional Speech, 80 IOWA L. REV. 735, 752 (1995) 
(“[W]e ordinarily understand the speech of a professor in a university to represent 
his or her own opinion.”); cf. infra Part II.C.1 (discussing the differences between 
university professors and K-12 teachers). 
 85. See Alger, supra note 44 (arguing that courts should not treat K-12 schools 
and higher education institutions in the same way and highlighting differences 
between them, including the idea that the state is the speaker in K-12 activities); see, 
e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270-72 (1988) (noting that 
schools have more control over promoting school-sponsored speech such as 
theatrical productions or newspapers because the speech may be attributed and, 
therefore, reflect upon the school as an institution); Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. 
of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 371 (4th Cir. 1996) (recognizing that local authorities should 
set K-12 curriculum because they are responsible for its content). 
 86. David Moshman, Academic Freedom:   Students Rights and Faculty Responsibilities, 
in PRESERVING INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 26, 29 (Jean E. Brown ed., 1994). 
 87. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 310, 322-23 (1980) (finding that 
although the choice to have an abortion is a constitutionally protected right, it does 
not follow that the government is bound to provide the financial resources for an 
abortion); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1977) (upholding a government 
program that funded childbirth but denied funding for non-therapeutic abortions 
and noting that the government may choose to favor childbirth over abortion and, if 
so, allocate public funds accordingly). 
 88. 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
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funds according to what it believes to be in the best interest of the 
public.89  Yet, in Rust, the Court in dicta noted: 
 “[T]he university is a traditional sphere of free expression so 
fundamental to the functioning of our society that the 
Government’s ability to control speech within that sphere by means 
of conditions attached to the expenditure of Government funds is 
restricted by the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines of the First 
Amendment.”90 
This statement suggests that the arguments applying to publicly-
funded speech may not be relevant in a university setting.91  
Accordingly, placing curriculum decisions in the legislature would 
insufficiently guide universities and, as a result, be void for 
vagueness.92  Rust only reinforces the argument that universities are 
unique government institutions, and, therefore, legislatures may have 
less control over universities than they have over other publicly-
funded institutions. 
4. Universities, like public radio stations, are exempt from the allowable
 governmental restraints on other publicly-funded institutions 
First Amendment violations normally do not occur when the state 
specifically targets its own institution because of the views it 
expresses.93  In 1984, however, the Supreme Court in Federal 
                                                          
 89. Id. at 200 (holding that government regulations prohibiting doctors working 
in a federally funded family planning program from discussing abortions with 
pregnant women do not violate the free speech of doctors and patients). 
 90. Id. (citing Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)). 
 91. But see Buss, supra note 17, at 259 (“Because the Court’s example was not 
talking about professorial speech that communicates the curriculum but only 
extramural political speech, the Rust Court’s academic freedom rhetoric must be 
kept in perspective.”). 
 92. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-33 (1963) (explaining that courts 
may apply the vagueness doctrine to regulatory laws that may have unfavorable 
consequences).  Despite the fact that this doctrine is typically applied to criminal 
laws, it may also be applied to statutes and regulations that would withhold funding 
to regulate the content of university curricula because losing funding would be an 
unfavorable consequence.  Id.  See Buss, supra note 17, at 269 (“A law that gives 
insufficient guidance to enable a person subject to its requirement to conform his or 
her behavior to the law is unenforceable.”).  In this respect, courses that may pass 
legislative scrutiny under one administration may be eliminated during another.  
Such failure on the part of the legislature to provide a standard of conduct coupled 
with the high risk of arbitrary enforcement could foreseeably violate the vagueness 
doctrine.  See also Jean E. Brown & Elaine C. Stephens, Being Proactive, Not Waiting for 
the Censor, in PRESERVING INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 125, 125 (Jean E. Brown ed., 1994) 
(arguing that the consequence of censorship is that professors “become overly 
cautious and create an atmosphere of nervous concern that inhibits their best 
professional judgment”). 
 93. See discussion supra Part I.A (discussing recent state legislative arguments that 
they may legitimately control the curricula of public schools). 
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Communications Commission v. League of Women Voters94 held that 
Congress may not condition funding for public radio stations on 
broadcasters’ agreements to avoid controversial subjects or to 
promote particular viewpoints.95  The Court based its decision on the 
fact that “broadcasters are engaged in a vital and independent form 
of communicative activity.”96  The Court’s acknowledgment of 
journalistic freedom is similar to the Court’s recognition of academic 
freedom,97 a concept discussed in Part II of this Comment below.  A 
previous case, Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC,98 gave radio stations an 
intermediate status between state actors and public discourse.99  For 
example, in Red Lion, rather than granting broadcasters First 
Amendment rights, the Court found “the right of the viewers and 
listeners” to be “paramount,”100 and still found the governmental 
actions limiting subject matter in violation.  Accordingly, another way 
of looking at this issue is to examine whether the universities are 
independent public opinion participants or instrumentalities of the 
state101 and whether the focus should be on the rights of the 
universities to speak or the rights of the students to learn.102  Part II 
examines these issues more closely. 
Like public radio stations, universities exist to expose their students 
(the “listeners”) to a variety of ideas, and similarly, too much 
regulation may endanger universities’ core objectives.  Thus, 
although there is little case law directly on point, a strong argument 
can be made that universities, like public radio stations, are 
                                                          
 94. 468 U.S. 364 (1984). 
 95. Id. at 407, 414 (examining the constitutionality of an FCC regulation 
forbidding “editorializing” by broadcasters receiving government grants). 
 96. Id. at 378. 
 97. See Rabban, supra note 15, at 273 (highlighting the fact that in League of 
Women Voters both the majority and the dissent agreed that Congress may not 
condition station funding on recipients’ promise to advance certain viewpoints or 
avoid certain subjects); see also League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 407 (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) (asserting that Congress may not impose content or viewpoint 
restrictions without a rational basis); id. at 414 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
citizen’s right to speak may not be conditioned upon the sovereign’s agreement with 
what the speaker intends to say.”). 
 98. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
 99. See id. at 390 (“Because of the scarcity of radio frequencies, the Government 
is permitted to put restraints on licensees in favor of others whose views should be 
expressed on this unique medium.”); see also Post, supra note 30, at 159 (explaining 
the Red Lion Court conceptualized broadcasters as “public trustees” and not 
“independent and private participants in public discourse”). 
 100. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390. 
 101. See Post, supra note 30, at 152 (noting that the question could be whether 
funding should be considered “government regulations imposed on persons” or “a 
form of government participation in the marketplace of ideas”). 
 102. See discussion infra Part II.B (discussing the right of the students to receive a 
variety of ideas and that such exposure enhances the quality of education). 
JELTEMA.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC 2/4/2005  3:25:08 PM 
234 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:215 
distinguishable from other state-funded institutions and, therefore, 
are not subject to legislative control.   
II. PROTECTING FIRST AMENDMENT INTERESTS 
In addition to the Supreme Court’s recognition that universities 
are unique institutions, the Court and others acknowledge the 
university community’s academic freedom, which protects internal 
decisions and warrants deference.  The primary justification for 
greater autonomy in higher education is the protection of 
universities as “peculiarly the ‘market place of ideas.’”103  Two types of 
academic freedom in America have developed over time to promote 
and protect the fundamental mission of higher education:  (1) the 
individual academic freedom of professors and faculty and (2) the 
institutional academic freedom of the university to govern its own 
affairs.  Academic freedom stems from several sources, including the 
1940 American Association of University Professors’ Statement 
(“AAUP Statement”),104 state constitutions that provide independence 
for institutions of higher education,105 and Supreme Court 
decisions.106  The most famous mention of First Amendment 
protection for academic freedom appeared in Keyishian v. Board of 
Regents,107 in which the Court deemed unconstitutional statutes calling 
for the dismissal of professors who taught Marxism.108  The Court 
declared that “[o]ur Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding 
academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us . . . . 
[and] [t]hat freedom is therefore a special concern of the First 
Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of 
orthodoxy over the classroom.”109  The international legal community 
also endorses this notion,110 which, given the Supreme Court’s 
                                                          
 103. See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). 
 104. See AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, 1940 STATEMENT OF 
PRINCIPLES ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE WITH 1970 INTERPRETIVE COMMENTS 
[hereinafter AAUP Statement] (arguing that academic freedom is essential to 
achieving the common good through the free search for and exposition of the truth) 
available at http://www.aaup.org/statements/Redbook/1940stat.htm (last updated 
Apr. 2003). 
 105. See supra note 47. 
 106. See, e.g., infra Part II.A.1. 
 107. 385 U.S. 589 (1967). 
 108. Id. at 609-10. 
 109. Id. at 603. 
 110. See Javier H. Rubinstein, International Law’s New Importance in the U.S.:   The 
Supreme Court’s Latest Term Provides the Most Recent Example, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 15, 2003, 
at 16 (arguing that courts need to develop a uniform framework for applying 
international law due to the rising frequency and necessity in matters before courts). 
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increasing references to international law in its opinions,111 lends 
additional support to this argument.112 
While the Supreme Court recognizes the importance of 
professorial and institutional academic freedom, it has offered no 
clear guidelines for deciding such cases.113  In addition, debate 
continues over whether academic freedom applies to both professors 
and institutions.114  The following sections examine the potential 
protection the First Amendment provides for university actors 
(students, professors, and universities) in matters of curriculum 
decisions. 
A. The University 
Courts recognize a First Amendment protection for universities.  In 
each of the examples of legislative action relating to curricula 
mentioned in the Introduction of this Comment, universities have 
stood behind their professors and classes, and the legislatures 
attempt to deny funding to universities as institutions.115  The 
                                                          
 111. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 344 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring) (remarking that the majority’s opinion corresponded with “the 
international understanding of the office of affirmative action” and referencing the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003) (relying partially upon the 
refusal of other nations to make homosexual conduct criminal when overturning 
Bowers v. Hardwick); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002) (noting the 
overwhelming disapproval “within the world community” of applying the death 
penalty to mentally retarded offenders); Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) 
(“[I]nternational law is part of our law . . . where there is no treaty, and no 
controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the 
customs and usages of civilized nations; and, as evidence of these, to the works of 
jurists and commentators. . . .”); United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 160-61 (1820) 
(holding that international law “may be ascertained by consulting the work of jurists, 
writing professedly on public law; or by the general usage and practice of nations; or 
by judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that law”). 
 112. Academic freedom in America is partially modeled after the traditional 
European protections granted to universities.  See Beach, supra note 51, at 308.  
European universities tend to possess definite legal protections.  For instance, the 
German constitution provides that alongside freedom of speech, “art and 
scholarship, research and teaching shall be free.”  GG art. 5. 
 113. See Lynch, supra note 17, at 1070-71 (listing the different approaches courts 
use, including the public forum analysis, First Amendment standards, government 
subsidy or employee analysis, and other court created standards of academic 
freedom). 
 114. See id. at 1072 (contrasting Professor Finkin’s “individual” academic freedom 
approach to Professor Byrne’s “institutional” academic freedom approach). 
 115. Professorial speech is closely tied to university speech.  See Elizabeth Mertz, 
The Burden of Proof and Academic Freedom:   Protection for Institution or Individual?, 82 
NW. U. L. REV. 492, 518 (1988) (“[U]niversities have an interest in defending the 
rights of individual academics, for it is only in their role as defenders of those rights 
that universities can claim any special constitutional status.”); see also Lynch, supra 
note 17, at 1103 (“[O]ne type of freedom is often impossible without the other.  A 
JELTEMA.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC 2/4/2005  3:25:08 PM 
236 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:215 
universities are backed by several cases that support the protection of 
institutional autonomy to decide internal affairs.116  The terms 
institutional autonomy and institutional academic freedom describe 
the system of self-government that has long been considered the 
“right and responsibility”117 of both private and public institutions of 
higher education.118  Although not absolute,119 this autonomy provides 
the necessary independence120 for universities to serve society by 
generating new ideas and providing a credible medium for social 
criticism.  The following subsections examine the Supreme Court’s 
acknowledgement of university academic freedom and the deference 
courts give to many internal university matters. 
1. The First Amendment protects academic freedom and institutional
 autonomy 
Evidence of the Supreme Court’s recognition of a First 
Amendment protection for university action comes from several 
                                                          
professor’s freedom means little if her university is shackled by the whim of the state, 
and a university’s freedom means little if its professors are pawns of the state.”); infra 
Part II.C.4 (arguing that university endorsement of a professor’s curriculum most 
likely extends the academic freedom of the university to the professor and thereby 
protects the professor’s choice of curriculum). 
 116. See Metzger, supra note 18, at 1318-19 (explaining that the Court has 
supported academic freedom as an extension of the freedom of speech and assembly 
clauses of the First Amendment, as well as the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment); see also Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 412 (4th Cir. 2000) (pointing 
out that to the extent that the Court has constitutionalized a right of academic 
freedom, the Court “appears to have recognized only an institutional right of self-
governance in academic affairs”).  But see Buss, supra note 17, at 231 (“The argument 
that institutional academic freedom is protected by the First Amendment seems even 
more clearly mistaken than the claim of First Amendment protection for individual 
academic freedom.”). 
 117. See Snyder, supra note 29 (explaining that autonomy does not mean absolute 
autonomy but reasonable autonomy).  The word “autonomy” originates from Greek 
“self” and “law or customary usage.”  Id. 
 118. See Brown, supra note 19, at 299-300 (citing the Carnegie Commission on 
Higher Education, Governance of Higher Education, Six Priority Problems at 17-18 
(1973)).  Brown explains that institutional autonomy consists of three parts.  Id.  
First, there is the “intellectual” autonomy, which involves the protection of academic 
freedom of speech of faculty and students.  Id.  Second, universities have “academic” 
autonomy regarding course offerings.  Id.  Finally, universities have the 
“administrative” autonomy in personnel and finance matters.  Id. 
 119. See Donna R. Euben, Academic Freedom of Individual Professors and Higher 
Education Institutions:   The Current Legal Landscape (May 2002) (clarifying that the 
decisions must hinge on academic grounds and require “the exclusion of 
governmental intervention in the intellectual life of a university”), available at 
http://www.aaup.org/Com-a/aeuben.HTM. 
 120. See Sorenson & LaManque, supra note 51, at 976 (1996) (pointing out that 
university autonomy “can be seen as an ‘external’ defense of academic freedom, one 
that while protecting the institution from outside encroachment, might permit 
undue institutional domination over faculty academic freedom interests”).  While a 
valid point, this issue is not examined in this Comment. 
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important cases.  In his concurring opinion in Sweezy v. State,121 Justice 
Frankfurter set out the “four essential freedoms” of universities to 
determine “who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be 
taught, and who may be admitted to study.” 122  Later, Justice Powell 
discussed the right of universities to make their own decisions 
regarding these “four essential freedoms” in Regents of the University of 
California v. Bakke,123 suggesting that universities’ interests in academic 
freedom justified the use of affirmative action.124  In Griswold v. 
Connecticut,125 the Court found that the right of freedom of speech 
“includes not only the right to utter or to print, but . . . freedom of 
inquiry, freedom of thought, and freedom to teach —− indeed the 
freedom of the entire university community.”126  In Tinker v. Des 
Moines Independent Community School District,127 the Court rejected the 
“principle that a State might so conduct its schools as to ‘foster a 
homogeneous people.’”128  These cases reveal the Supreme Court’s 
obvious concern for preserving public universities’ position as 
institutions free from governmental and political influence.  The 
following subsections look at how this Court, and others, have acted 
on this concern, most notably by deferring to university decisions. 
a. Courts’ continued deference to public university internal decision-
making 
On numerous occasions the Supreme Court has recognized the 
value of respecting internal educational decisions,129 the most recent 
and important example being Grutter v. Bollinger.130  In Grutter, Justice 
O’Connor noted the Court’s “tradition of giving a degree of 
                                                          
 121. 354 U.S. 234, 245 (1957) (finding the New Hampshire legislature in violation 
of the First Amendment for impeding on academic freedom by inquiring into the 
contents of a university professor’s lecture). 
 122. Id. at 263 (“It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which 
is most conducive to speculation, experiment, and creation.”) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring). 
 123. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 124. See id. at 312 (finding that universities may consider race in admissions 
practices); see also Yudof, supra note 76, at 855 (explaining that Powell’s opinion does 
not seem to turn on the fact that the university is public). 
 125. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 126. Id. at 482. 
 127. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 128. Id. at 511 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923)). 
 129. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985) (holding 
that the University of Michigan’s refusal to allow a student to retake an exam was not 
actionable). 
 130. 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003) (explaining that the Court has “long recognized 
that, given the important purpose of public education and the expansive freedoms of 
speech and thought associated with the university environment, universities occupy a 
special niche in our constitutional tradition”). 
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deference to a university’s academic decisions within constitutionally 
prescribed limits.”131  Other federal courts have also followed the 
practice of giving deference to universities with respect to internal 
institutional matters.132  For example, in Linnemeir v. Board of Trustees 
of Purdue University (IPFW),133 the Seventh Circuit decided a case where 
Indiana taxpayers and legislators attempted to force the public 
university to cancel the production of a controversial play about 
blasphemy.134  The court upheld the university’s right to stage this 
production, explaining that “[a]cademic freedom and states’ rights, 
alike demand deference to educational judgments that are not 
invidious.”135  Recently, the Third Circuit in Forum for Academic and 
Institutional Rights v. Rumsfeld136 held that law schools have a First 
Amendment right to convey a message that opposes discrimination 
against gays by excluding military recruiters, even against a 
congressional act requiring active assistance.137  The court’s finding of 
a First Amendment expressive right for law schools was based upon 
the reality that higher education institutions deserve deference 
because “universities and law schools ‘occupy a special niche in our 
constitutional tradition.’”138  These opinions, combined with the 
Grutter opinion’s strong recognition of institutional academic 
                                                          
 131. Id. 
 132. See generally Linnemeir v. Bd. of Trs. of Purdue Univ., 260 F.3d 757, 760 (7th 
Cir. 2001) (“Classrooms are not public forums; but the school authorities and the 
teachers, not the courts, decide whether classroom instruction shall include works by 
blasphemers.”); Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 410 (4th Cir. 2000) (explaining 
that any right of academic freedom “inheres in the University, not in individual 
professors”); Feldman v. Ho, 171 F.3d 494, 495 (7th Cir. 1999) (“A university’s 
academic independence is protected by the Constitution, just like a faculty member’s 
own speech.”); Bishop v. Aranov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1075 (11th Cir. 1991) (“Federal 
judges should not be ersatz deans or educators.  In this regard, we trust that the 
University will serve its own interests as well as those of its professors in pursuit of 
academic freedom.”); Parate v. Isibor, 868 F.2d 821, 826 (6th Cir. 1989) (quoting 
Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226, 226 n.12 (1985)) 
(“Academic freedom thrives not only on the robust and uninhibited exchange of 
ideas between the individual professor and his students, but also on the ‘autonomous 
decision-making [of] . . . the academy itself.’”). 
 133. 260 F.3d 757 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 134. Id. at 758. 
 135. Id. at 760. 
 136. 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 137. Id. at 233, 246.  This case challenged the Solomon Amendment, which 
required the Department of Defense to deny federal funding to institutions of higher 
education that prohibited military representatives from accessing the schools for 
recruiting purposes.  Id. at 225.  The court points out that the members of Congress 
who voted against this amendment based their opposition on academic freedom 
grounds.  Id. at 226. 
 138. Id. at 233 n.13 (2004) (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, Sweezy v. New Hampshire, and 
Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing). 
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freedom suggests that the deference courts give universities also 
extends to legislative matters. 
b. The Supreme Court’s disapproval of “content-based” regulation and
 deference towards “legitimate academic decision-making” 
Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly stated whether 
curriculum decisions warrant deference, cases suggest that the Court 
would likely respect these actions.  In 1990, the Court decided 
University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC,139 and by ruling on whether 
universities enjoy a special privilege against disclosure of peer review 
materials in tenure decisions,140 gave a clearer depiction of the 
boundaries of institutional academic freedom.  Although the 
University of Pennsylvania is a private educational institution,141 the 
Court spoke of situations when the “government attempts to direct 
the content of speech at public educational institutions” and asserted 
that “complicated First Amendment issues are presented because 
[the] government is simultaneously both speaker and regulator.”142 
The Court reasoned that in academic freedom cases such as 
Keyishian and Sweezy, the government tried to control the content of 
university speech.143  Using Keyishian as an example of such content-
based regulation, the Court discussed how the government 
incorrectly attempted to “substitute” its own teacher employment 
criteria for that already in use by universities, therefore “directly and 
completely usurping the discretion of each institution.”144  The Court 
concluded by suggesting that courts have long emphasized that they 
give deference to universities with regard to “legitimate academic 
judgments.”145  A curriculum very likely falls within the boundaries of 
a “genuinely academic decision,”146 thus warranting deference by 
                                                          
 139. 493 U.S. 182 (1990).  In this case, when the university refused tenure to an 
associate professor, she filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission on the grounds that the decision was the product of unlawful sexual 
discrimination.  Id. at 185. 
 140. Id. at 184 (examining whether the privilege could be based on common law 
or the First Amendment).  The Court held that Congressional intent was lacking to 
create a privilege against disclosure and also that an academic freedom protection 
could not be extended in this case because the situation did not involve “content” 
regulation and the infringement was too attenuated and speculative.  Id. at 189-90, 
197-201. 
 141. Id. at 185. 
 142. Id. at 198 n.6 (citations omitted). 
 143. Id. at 197. 
 144. Id. at 198. 
 145. Id. at 199 (quoting Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 
(1985)). 
 146. Id.  For example, teaching employment criteria is an example of a “genuinely 
academic decision.”  Id. at 198. 
JELTEMA.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC 2/4/2005  3:25:08 PM 
240 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:215 
courts and legislatures alike.  Therefore, there is a strong argument 
that public universities have a right to decide their own curricula, 
free from legislative influence. 
2. Legislatures are interfering with the institutional academic freedom of
 universities to decide their own curricula 
The previous subsections examined how the Supreme Court 
acknowledges the importance of public university autonomy in 
decision-making, suggesting that with regard to curriculum decisions, 
which are internal, legislatures should defer to the university.  
Specifically, the Court in University of Pennsylvania seemed to 
recognize a First Amendment protection for universities against 
legislative attempts to control the content of university speech and 
the selection of instructors.147  Although no court has clearly defined 
the scope of institutional academic freedom,148 curriculum decisions 
likely fall into the description of both self-governance and content of 
university speech. 
In conclusion, the academic freedom defined by case law suggests 
some limitations on legislatures’ power to regulate public universities.  
Based on University of Pennsylvania (which defines “who may teach” as 
within the scope)149 and Grutter v. Bollinger (which defines who may 
study),150 it appears that the Court finds institutional decisions that 
implicate the universities’ educational functions and fall within 
Sweezy’s “four essential freedoms”151 to trigger protected areas of 
academic freedom.  Since the curriculum is a determination of 
Sweezy’s “what may be taught” and “how it may be taught,”152 there is a 
strong argument that the Court recognizes deference to curriculum 
decisions as well.  Public universities likely have a First Amendment 
right to create and implement curricula, and consequently, legislative 
control over curricula violates university autonomy and academic 
freedom under the First Amendment. 
                                                          
 147. See id. (noting with relief that the facts of the case preclude the Court from 
defining any such right).  The principle behind University of Pennsylvania likely 
extends to public institutions as well.  See also NEIL HAMILTON, ZEALOTRY AND 
ACADEMIC FREEDOM:   A LEGAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 159, 191-92 (1995) 
(pointing out that this academic freedom likely does not extend to the case when a 
university restricts professors’ contractual, statutory or constitutional speech). 
 148. See Rabban, supra note 15, at 271 (describing judicial “reiteration” of 
academic freedom as containing “substantial ambiguity”). 
 149. 493 U.S. at 198. 
 150. 539 U.S. 306, 341-43 (2003). 
 151. Sweezy v. State, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) 
(citation omitted); see Rabban, supra note 15, at 271-72 (noting that “What may be 
taught” is one of the four freedoms). 
 152. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
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B. The Students 
Legislative control of curricula may also violate the First 
Amendment rights of students attending public universities.  The 
following sections look at how the Supreme Court rejects state 
influence in education when there is a danger of creating 
homogeneity.  In addition, case law suggests that students have a 
right of exposure to controversial ideas in education.  This section 
concludes that the Court’s recent declaration of the importance of 
diversity in education provides a strong argument that legislative 
control impedes upon university students’ First Amendment rights. 
1. The Supreme Court’s uneasiness about homogeneity  
Like the Michigan example in the Introduction, state legislative 
control of curricula can result in the elimination of courses about 
topics that individual legislators deem inappropriate.153  One of the 
primary reasons for compulsory K-12 education is the exposure of 
children to the attitudes, knowledge and behaviors that society 
regards as important.154  Scholars, however, suggest that restricting 
what is taught in schools violates the “learning rights” of students.155  
To guarantee the uncontrolled flow of ideas and information in the 
school “marketplace of ideas,”156 students require both a right to 
speak and to hear.157  However, if legislatures can decide what ideas 
may enter the public education “marketplace,” there is a real 
possibility of molding students into one homogenous people,158 a 
                                                          
 153. See supra notes 1, 8, 10-12 and accompanying text. 
 154. See ROBERT WHEELER LANE, BEYOND THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE:   FREE SPEECH 
AND THE INCULCATION OF VALUES 31 (1995) (discussing the emphasis on compulsory 
education as a tool to integrate children into society and explaining that the 
Supreme Court has recognized an “intermediate constitutional status” for 
schoolchildren, which requires both protection and autonomy). 
 155. See generally NATIONAL COUNCIL OF TEACHERS OF ENGLISH, PRESERVING 
INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM:   FIGHTING CENSORSHIP IN OUR SCHOOLS 32 (Jean E. Brown 
ed., 1994).  A scholar suggests that when making the connection between the First 
Amendment and learning, the rationales for the First Amendment must be taken 
into account.  See Moshman, supra note 86, at 29. (“[R]espect for personal dignity, 
promotion of truth, and protection of democracy . . . are generally acknowledged.”). 
 156. See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (recognizing that a 
diverse learning environment prevents a stunted educational experience). 
 157. See Moshman, supra note 86, at 32 (discussing students’ First Amendment 
rights, which encompass freedom of belief and expression, access to ideas and 
limitations on inculcation); see also Lane, supra note 154, at 86 (reiterating that 
schools should “ensure the free flow of information and ideas”). 
 158. See Moshman, supra note 86, at 30 (explaining the different positions 
regarding the role of schools as tools to integrate students into society and balancing 
this concept with inculcation). 
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danger warned against by Justice Fortas in Tinker v. Des Moines 
Independent Community School District.159 
Tinker160 stands for the principle that K-12 students have a right to 
create, maintain and express their own beliefs so long as they do not 
substantially disrupt class work or the rights of other students.161  The 
Court asserted that in the American system, “state-operated schools 
may not be enclaves of totalitarianism”162 and that “students may not 
be regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only that which the State 
chooses to communicate.”163  The Court’s emphasis on the harm in 
creating “a homogenous people”164 likely, and more conclusively, 
extends to university students because they are more like adults.165  By 
limiting what courses universities may offer based upon legislators’ 
personal perceptions of what is appropriate for adult students, 
legislative control of higher education curricula runs the risk of 
producing the dreaded homogenous citizenry. 
2. Access to information and ideas:  a right to receive 
Besides the Supreme Court’s aversion to a homogenous citizenry as 
a justification for legislative noninvolvement, another issue is whether 
the First Amendment grants university students the “right to receive” 
third party information.  While most of the case law deals with high 
school students’ access to controversial library books,166 the Court has 
                                                          
 159. 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 
(1923)) (highlighting that a state may not “so conduct its schools as to ‘foster a 
homogeneous people’”). 
 160. Id. at 513-14 (holding unlawful the suspension of high school students who 
wore black armbands to protest the Vietnam War). 
 161. Id. at 514. Student expression can be restricted only if it can be shown that 
the “action was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the 
discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”  Id. 
at 509.  But see Lief H. Carter, Mind-Control Applications of the Constitutional Law of 
Censorship, in PRESERVING INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 205, 210 (Jean E. Brown ed., 1994) 
(pointing out that Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier practically overruled the 
Tinker “substantial disruption” standard by applying a “rational basis” test); see also 
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (distinguishing between 
punishing student expression from supporting student expression and holding that a 
school does not violate the First Amendment if it controls the content of school-
sponsored student speech provided that the reason for doing so is “reasonably 
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns”). 
 162. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 166. See Lane, supra note 154, at 130 (explaining that most of the controversy has 
erupted around the removal of books from high school libraries); see, e.g., In 
Presidents Council, Dist. 25 v. Cmty. Sch. Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d 289, 291-92 (2d Cir. 
1972) (upholding a school board’s decision to remove a book said to contain 
offensive and sexual language on the basis of the board’s authority to prescribe the 
curriculum).  But see Minarcini v. Strongsville City Sch. Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 582-83 
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found a right to receive this kind of information for adults in several 
areas,167 and therefore, university students likely have a right of access 
to educational sources such as classes.168  The primary case addressing 
access to library books is Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free 
School District v. Pico.169  In finding that a school board violates high 
school students’ First Amendment rights by removing controversial 
books from the library merely out of disagreement with the content 
of the books,170 the Pico plurality opinion partially based its reasoning 
on the First Amendment’s purpose of offering access to the 
“marketplace of ideas.”171  In his opinion, Justice Brennan found the 
ability to receive information from third parties crucial to 
safeguarding students from the “pall of orthodoxy” cast by school 
officials.172  Pico better supports university (rather than high school) 
students’ right to receive information because university students, as 
adults, need not be shielded from controversial ideas and materials.173 
An Eighth Circuit case, Pratt v. Independent School District No. 83,174 
provides some insight as to how courts approach the issue of student 
rights.  In Pratt, parents of some high school students petitioned the 
school board to eliminate from the curriculum the film “The 
Lottery.”175  Although teachers and students defended the film, the 
school board removed it from the curriculum.176  Three students 
brought suit, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court ruling, 
forbidding school officials from imposing a “‘pall of orthodoxy’ on 
                                                          
(6th Cir. 1976) (invalidating the school board’s decision to remove books from the 
library merely because the board found the books to be objectionable and 
recognizing the students’ right to receive the information). 
 167. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (recognizing a right of 
access to “social, political, aesthetic, moral, and other ideas”); see also Lane, supra 
note 154, at 136. 
 168. See Moshman, supra note 86, at 32 (describing students’ right of “access to 
ideas and sources” without content-based restrictions and inculcation interfering 
with that access); cf. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 871-71 (1982) (plurality) 
(holding that a school board’s removal of books from the school library based on the 
board’s disagreement with the content of the books violated students’ First 
Amendment rights).  However, the Pico Court distinguished between curriculum and 
library books.  Id. at 861-62, 869. 
 169. 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (plurality). 
 170. Id. at 871-71. 
 171. Pico, 457 U.S. at 867; see Lane, supra note 154, at 136-37 (depicting access to 
the marketplace as “the right to receive opinions and information [which] follows 
‘ineluctably’ from the sender’s right to send them”). 
 172. Pico, 457 U.S. at 870 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 
(1967)). 
 173. See Buss, supra note 17, at 276. 
 174. 670 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1982). 
 175. A film based on the 1948 short story by Shirley Jackson in which, each year, 
small town citizens must select a person to be stoned to death.  Id. at 773. 
 176. Id. at 773-74. 
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classroom instruction which implicates the state in the propagation of 
a particular religious or ideological viewpoint.”177  Similar to the 
Michigan example,178 the “[o]pponents of “The Lottery” focused 
primarily on the purported religious and ideological impact” of the 
curriculum choice.179  The court found the students’ “right to receive 
information and to be exposed to controversial ideas—a fundamental 
First Amendment right.”180 
The fact that Pratt and Pico dealt with high school students only 
strengthens the case against legislative curriculum control over public 
universities, where the students are older and more mature than high 
school students.181  In fact, law and society tend to accept the view that 
university students are adults.182  In addition, the goals behind K-12 
and higher education differ vastly.183  Specifically, if the objective of 
higher education is to expose students to a wide range of ideas so 
that they may be better prepared for the future,184 what better way to 
fend off the “enclaves of totalitarianism”185 than to guarantee students 
the right to receive controversial ideas so they can make up their own 
minds? 
                                                          
 177. Id. at 776 (citations omitted). 
 178. See supra notes 1, 8-9 and accompanying text. 
 179. Pratt, 670 F.2d at 776-77 (referring to the opponents arguments as “value-
laden”). 
 180. Id. at 779 (proposing that a harmful precedent would be set if the films were 
banned simply because people opposed the ideological theme).  But see Lane, supra 
note 154, at 152 (arguing that the Eighth Circuit erred by disregarding the “taste, 
values, morality, and sensitivities of the school board” as not legitimate grounds and 
making this a First Amendment issue rather than a curriculum decision issue).  Lane 
also argues that the right to receive information granted to adults should not be 
broadened to cover high school students.  Id. 
 181. See discussion and accompanying notes supra Part I.B.2 (discussing the 
differences between high school and university students). 
 182. University students have much more freedom than K-12 students.  They live 
away from home and often pay their own tuition and housing.  In addition, university 
students have stronger legal rights, such as the right to get married and to serve in 
the military.  See Kincaid v. Gibson, 191 F.3d 719, 731 n.1 (6th Cir. 1999) (Cole, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Most students are at least eighteen years 
old when they enter college, an age at which society affords them some of the same 
rights as adults (i.e. the right to vote).”), vacated by 197 F.3d 828 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 183. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 184. See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (recognizing that 
diversity of ideas contributes to the strengths of the nation’s leaders). 
 185. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969). 
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3. Diversity is a compelling governmental interest 
Scholars,186 students,187 and the Supreme Court188 recognize the 
importance of diversity of students and ideas in education.  The goal 
of higher education is to train future leaders “through wide exposure 
to that robust exchange of ideas.”189  Statistics indicate that the 
environment most conducive to learning and developing is one in 
which students have access to a variety of viewpoints and then have 
the freedom to both adopt and discuss their own opinions.190  
Recently, the Supreme Court in Grutter v. Bollinger191 deferred to the 
University of Michigan Law School’s decision with respect to 
including diversity as a factor in admission procedures because 
“diversity is essential to its educational mission.”192  In fact, the Court 
found diversity to be so compelling an interest that it overrides the 
Equal Protection Clause and allows universities to exclude qualified 
students based upon race.193  Grutter and other cases194 strongly 
support the argument that legislatures must defer to educational 
judgments by universities in curriculum matters that promote the 
“robust exchange of ideas”195 among students. 
While it is true that state legislatures do not directly censor student 
speech by telling universities what classes they can offer, these 
directives do eliminate the right of students to “shop” and select 
courses that produce a diversified education.  In Lamont v. Postmaster 
General,196 in which the Court invalidated a federal statute that 
forbade the delivery of “communist political propaganda” unless the 
                                                          
 186. See, e.g., Hugh Agee, Literature, Intellectual Freedom, and the Ecology of the 
Imagination, in PRESERVING INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 53, 62 (Jean E. Brown ed., 1994) 
(stating that education “will be limited if we allow censors to dictate how and with 
what resources we operate in our schools . . . [t]his is a significant part of our 
stewardship obligation if the ecology of the imagination is to be a moving force in 
our society”). 
 187. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1954) (litigating for the 
right to integrate schools to have equal educational opportunities). 
 188. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327-30 (2003) (finding that a 
school has a compelling interest in maintaining a diverse student body because of 
the educational and social benefits that arise out of that diversity). 
 189. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). 
 190. See, e.g., Gregory A. Clarick, Note, Public School Teachers and the First 
Amendment:   Protecting the Right to Teach, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693, 723 (1990) (arguing 
that too much emphasis on skills may limit students’ ability to think independently in 
the future). 
 191. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 192. Id. at 333-34 (noting that as to diversity, the “benefits are not theoretical but 
real”). 
 193. Id. at 328-29. 
 194. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 195. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603. 
 196. 381 U.S. 301 (1965). 
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recipient specifically requested delivery in writing,197 Justice Brennan, 
in his concurrence, wrote:  “The dissemination of ideas can 
accomplish nothing if otherwise willing addressees are not free to 
receive and consider them.  It would be a barren marketplace of 
ideas that had only sellers and no buyers.”198  Legislative 
determination as to which courses are appropriate for higher 
education contravenes the purposes of higher education, which 
include exposing students to a wide range of new ideas and allowing 
students to think critically about the ideas.199 
C. The Faculty 
Legislative control of curricula may also violate the First 
Amendment rights of public university professors.  The following 
sections look at how university professors are different than K-12 
teachers and other state employees by discussing the development of 
professorial academic freedom, a concept that makes university 
professors unique state employees.  The section concludes that 
although professors have a weak argument in opposition to legislative 
oversight of curricula, the First Amendment protection for university 
academic freedom likely safeguards professorial curriculum decisions 
as well. 
1. Professors are different from K-12 teachers 
When a professor designs and teaches a course, she acts in her 
professional capacity as a state employee and is indeed accountable to 
both the university and the state.200  The unique nature of a university 
working environment, however, differs from other places of public 
employment,201 such as a secondary school.202  The educational 
                                                          
 197. Id. at 307 (“[The] addressee is likely to feel some inhibition in sending for 
literature which the federal officials have condemned . . . .”). 
 198. Id. at 308 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 199. See, e.g., Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603 (“The vigilant protection of constitutional 
freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American Schools.”) 
(citations omitted).  If amended, the Michigan Constitution would allow the 
legislature to create one homogenous people by forbidding classes about 
controversial ideas, a danger the Court warns against in Tinker.  See Tinker v. Des 
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969). 
 200. See Anna L. Rossi, The Exception to the Rule:   Government Employers’ Right to 
Restrict Free Speech of Employees, 29 J.C. & U.L. 719, 731 n.88 (“Public school teachers 
and state college or university professors may not usually think of themselves as 
government employees, but for many legal purposes they are.”).  University faculty 
can accurately be described as agents of the state and are therefore responsible for 
serving the state’s objectives.  See Buss, supra note 17, at 217 (explaining that the state 
delegates to teachers the authority to “communicate the curriculum”). 
 201. See supra Part I.B.1 (discussing the difference between universities and other 
state agencies in terms of structure and purpose). 
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functions of K-12 teachers and university professors are dissimilar in 
some respects.  Whereas parents and students may consider 
elementary and secondary school teachers to be role models203 and 
may count on them to teach the grade levels and subjects and courses 
assigned by their schools within the curriculum determined by state 
and local governments,204 university professors have considerable 
autonomy when choosing teaching and research topics.205  Besides 
having more freedom in curriculum decisions, university professors 
also have a stronger First Amendment academic freedom interest, as 
the following subsection discusses. 
2. The development of professorial academic freedom 
To address the special expressive concerns of professors, in 1915 
academics created the American Association of University Professors 
(“AAUP”), which set forth a definition of academic freedom for 
professors.  The AAUP definition of faculty self-governance grants 
professors freedom from university employer intrusion into teaching, 
research, and intra and extramural expressions.206  Many universities 
have adopted this definition in employment contracts,207 and courts, 
including the Supreme Court, have referenced the 1940 version of 
the AAUP Statement in their opinions.208  In 1952, the dissenting 
                                                          
 202. Unlike in universities, state and local governments have long dictated the 
curriculum to K-12 teachers.  See supra Part I.B.2. 
 203. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584 (1987) (finding that the State 
has “great authority and coercive power . . . because of the students’ emulation of 
teachers as role models”); Epperson v. Ark., 393 U.S. 97, 112, 114 (1968) (Black, J., 
concurring) (arguing that school authorities have the right to limit a school 
teacher’s academic freedom to a certain degree); see also Lynch, supra note 17, at 
1083 (suggesting that when the school goal is inculcation of civility and other values, 
the teacher is a role model). 
 204. See Yudof, supra note 76, at 836 (finding that professors are expected to 
independently study, research, and teach different areas within their fields while 
school teachers must follow a set curriculum). 
 205. Id.  The reason is that in higher education, the goal is to promote public 
discourse and critical inquiry.  See Lynch, supra note 17, at 1084 (discussing the 
different levels of academic freedom a professor may have depending on the goals of 
the university); Hamilton, supra note 147, at 192 (stating that a university may not 
rely on the fact that it is academically free from government control to restrict a 
professor’s academic speech). 
 206. See AAUP Statement, supra note 104 (“[A] faculty member’s expression of 
opinion as a citizen cannot constitute grounds for dismissal unless it clearly 
demonstrates the faculty member’s unfitness for his or her position.”).  But see Rossi, 
supra note 200, at 731 (“[P]rofessors at public universities . . . have only those speech 
rights that governmental employees have . . . .”). 
 207. See AAUP Statement, supra note 104 (listing the endorsers of the 1940 
Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure). 
 208. See, e.g., Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 756 (1976) (commenting 
that colleges abide by the AAUP’s 1940 Statement); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 
672, 681-82 (1971) (finding that several colleges and universities had an “atmosphere 
of academic freedom rather than religious indoctrination” evidenced, for example, 
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opinion in Adler v. Board of Education209 first mentioned academic 
freedom for teachers.  In challenging the Feinberg Law,210 which 
rendered ineligible for public teaching any member of an 
organization characterized as advocating the overthrow of the 
government by illegal means,211 Justice Douglas declared that a 
“system of spying and surveillance . . . cannot go hand in hand with 
academic freedom.”212  However, not until the late 1960s did any real 
constitutional protection for the academic speech of public university 
professors develop.213  Since then, there has been a continuous 
recognition of academic freedom for professors.214  Whether this 
academic freedom extends to protection from legislative oversight of 
curriculum is unclear.  Accordingly, the next section examines 
whether existing tests apply when legislatures want to control 
university professors’ curriculum choices. 
3. The Pickering and Connick tests 
Absent university support, case law probably does not support 
professors’ claim to a First Amendment right to establish curricula 
free from legislative oversight.  In Pickering v. Board of Education,215 the 
Supreme Court held that the First Amendment protects a professor’s 
speech as long as it addresses a matter of public concern.216  The 
                                                          
that “[a]ll four institutions . . . subscribe to the 1940 Statement of Principles on 
Academic Freedom and Tenure endorsed” by the AAUP). 
 209. 342 U.S. 485, 508 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting), overruled in part by Keyshian 
v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). 
 210. See N.Y. EDUCATION LAW § 3022 (McKinney 1949). 
 211. See Adler, 342 U.S. at 492. 
 212. Id. at 510-11 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 213. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (finding teachers may not 
be dismissed for speaking on matters of public concern); see also Hamilton, supra 
note 147, at 195 (stating that until the late 1960s courts were unwilling to offer 
teachers “constitutional protection for freedom of speech”).  But see Buss, supra note 
17, at 220 (arguing the First Amendment does not give teachers a constitutionally 
protected right of academic freedom). 
 214. This academic freedom is typically subject to university requirements and 
objectives.  The university seeks to achieve its mission by hiring faculty.  Without the 
authority to somewhat control the speech of professors, the educational mission of 
universities may be impeded.  See Yudof, supra note 76, at 838 (presenting a 
hypothetical of a demography professor spending his class time on the topic of 
university mismanagement); see also Chris Hoofnagle, Matters of Public Concern and the 
Public University Professor, 27 J.C. & U.L. 669, 689-90 (2001) (stating that judges are 
unlikely to protect a professor’s academic freedom regarding issues such as 
“academic standards, teaching methods, and choice of classroom materials and 
curriculum”).  However, in the examples mentioned in the Introduction, universities 
have fully supported the professors’ curriculum decisions.  See supra Introduction and 
accompanying footnotes. 
 215. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
 216. Id. at 575 (finding the board of education had unlawfully fired a teacher for 
writing a newspaper article that criticized the school’s greater use of funds for 
athletics); see also Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 406 (4th Cir. 2000) (stating that 
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Pickering Court applied a balancing test in which it examined “the 
interest of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of 
public concern and the interest of the state, as an employer, in 
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its 
employees.”217 
Although this test is only valid when public educators are speaking 
as citizens,218 in 1983, in Connick v. Meyers,219 the Court addressed 
situations in which employees are speaking as employees and not as 
private citizens.220  In the analysis, the Court set forth a two-step test:  
whether the public employee’s speech is a matter of public 
importance;221 and if so, whether the employer’s interest in 
“promoting the efficiency of the public service it performs” is greater 
than the employee’s interest in speaking on the matter.222 
Recently, in Urofsky v. Gilmore,223 the Fourth Circuit specifically dealt 
with public university professorial speech and decided that 
professors, when speaking on matters of public concern, must have 
been acting as private citizens rather than as public employees.224  The 
court in Urofsky found that the Virginia legislature’s prohibition of 
public employee access225 to sexually explicit materials available 
through the Internet on state-owned computers was valid.226  The 
court reasoned that because the state “purchases” professor speech by 
hiring them and providing Internet access, the state could control 
                                                          
the court must look at the relatedness of the speech to the speaker’s employment 
duties). 
 217. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. 
 218. Id. 
 219. 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
 220. In Connick, an assistant district attorney subject to transfer circulated a 
questionnaire about work issues in her office and was fired.  Id. at 138. 
 221. Id. at 146-48 (defining a matter of public concern as any expression that may 
“be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social or other concern to 
the community,” and “must be determined by the content, form, and context of a 
given statement”).  The employee’s speech most likely fails the test if not a matter of 
public concern.  Id. at 147.  See also Hamilton, supra note 147, at 197 (describing the 
Supreme Court’s analysis in Connick v. Meyers). 
 222. Connick, 461 U.S. at 142-43.  When examining the second prong of the test, a 
court should look at a number of factors. Id. at 150.  For example, deference is 
typically awarded to the employer’s judgment, and the manner, place and time of the 
speech, as well as the context of the speech, are all relevant.  Id. at 151-53.  Finally, 
the public employer must offer evidence that the employee’s speech disrupts or 
undermines the operations.  Id. at 154. 
 223. 216 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2000). 
 224. Id. at 409. 
 225. The court considered the access in regard to a professor’s capacity as 
employees.  Id. 
 226. Id. at 404.  Six public college and university professors in Virginia brought 
suit.  The exception to the Virginia statute was if the access was “required in 
conjunction with a bona fide, agency-approved research project or other agency-
approved undertaking.”  Id. 
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the expression related to its purchase.227  The court deduced that to 
find otherwise, public university professors would have “a First 
Amendment right to dictate to the state how they will do their jobs.”228  
In other words, the Urofsky court decided that professors are merely 
“pawns of the state.”229  However, the court did find that an academic 
freedom right “inheres in the [u]niversity.”230  Although Urofsky sits in 
stark contrast to prior public concern case law231 and does not 
specifically address professor speech in the context of curriculum, the 
case supports state control of the content of public employee speech, 
and likely professorial choice of curriculum as well.232 
In addition, it is unclear whether curriculum is even a “matter of 
public concern.”  The cases that apply Connick to university settings 
tend to be situations where university professors publish or speak on 
controversial issues outside of the classroom.233  Public education is, 
by nature, an arena for public debate, therefore employee speech 
regarding curriculum would seem to satisfy the first part of Connick.234  
Yet when curriculum choice is at issue, cases like Urofsky 
overwhelmingly indicate that the academic freedom of the 
                                                          
 227. Id. at 407. 
 228. Id. 
 229. See Lynch, supra note 17, at 1064, 1073 (arguing that the Urofsky decision 
reveals the confusion over and pressing necessity for guidelines in academic freedom 
analysis). 
 230. See Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 410, 415 n.17 (noting “the Act leaves decisions 
concerning subjects of faculty research in the hands of the institution”). 
 231. See Hoofnagle, supra note 214, at 687 (arguing that Urofsky “relies on a false 
analogy, and concludes erroneously that protecting job-related speech would 
empower employees to ignore their employer’s wishes or act in defiance of their 
directions”).  In addition, with four dissenting judges and the chief judge (in a 
concurring opinion) writing to disagree with the majority’s rejection of the First 
Amendment protection for academic freedom, it may be unlikely that other courts 
will follow the Urofsky court.  See David M. Rabban, Academic Freedom, Individual or 
Institutional?, ACADEME, Nov.-Dec. 2001, available at http://www.aaup.org/public-
ations/Academe/2001/01nd/01ndrab.htm); see also Lynch, supra note 17, at 1100 
(finding the Urofsky holding “clearly wrong” because the court’s automatic deference 
to the state is contrary to the Supreme Court’s many declarations that public 
employees do not lose their First Amendment rights completely). 
 232. See Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 404 (holding that state regulation of public employee 
speech does not violate First Amendment speech rights). 
 233. See, e.g., Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 368-69 (4th 
Cir. 1996) (finding that because a high school drama teacher’s choice of a play was 
made in her position as a public employee, her choice was not a matter of public 
concern); Mahaffey v. Kan. Bd. of Regents, 562 F. Supp. 887, 890 (D. Kan. 1983) 
(finding no public concern in a professor’s complaint about salary, job perks and 
position). 
 234. See Hamilton, supra note 147, at 201 (noting that a broad range of topics 
relating to public education may be considered matters of public concern for 
purposes of the Connick test, including admission standards policies, curriculum 
decisions, or grading policies).  But see Buss, supra note 17, at 240 (arguing that what 
should make up the curriculum differs from “the speaking that is necessary to 
implement the curriculum”). 
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institution, but not that of the professor, protects classroom material 
and curriculum choice.235  That is, a university may reasonably control 
the curriculum decisions of professors and, therefore, speech rights 
of professors are subject to university agreement.236  However, in the 
Michigan, Kansas, and North Carolina examples,237 the universities 
have accepted and supported the curriculum choices of the 
professors.238  Thus, neither the Pickering nor Connick tests need apply 
when internal university decision-making has already accepted 
professor curriculum choices.239  Similarly, legislatures attempting to 
use these tests as a basis for curriculum control will fail for the same 
reason. 
4. University academic freedom protects professors’ curriculum decisions 
Although the First Amendment prevents the government from 
restricting the expressions of private actors, the Constitution does 
very little to forbid the states from imposing ideas about what is best 
for the public, hiring people to convey these ideas, and requiring 
them to do their jobs.240  On numerous levels it can be argued that 
                                                          
 235. See, e.g., Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 410 (holding that the right of academic freedom 
inheres in the university as an institution, not in professors as individuals); Edwards 
v. Cal. Univ. of Pa., 156 F.3d 488, 493 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding that a professor had no 
First Amendment protection to decide a curriculum that differed from what the 
university ordered). 
 236. See, e.g., Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1078 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that 
a university may restrict the content of curriculum conveyed during class time).  The 
reasoning behind such rulings is commonly that “affording constitutional protection 
to these issues would keep the institution from defining and performing its 
educational mission.”  See Hoofnagle, supra note 214, at 690. 
 237. See supra notes 1, 8, 10-12 and accompanying text. 
 238. See, e.g., Joan Wallach Scott, For the Record:   Higher Education and Middle Eastern 
Studies Following September 11, 2001, Four Presidents Speak Out for Academic Freedom, 
ACADEME Nov.-Dec. 2002 (noting that a strong commitment to academic freedom has 
led to staunch support of professor curriculum choice by university presidents), 
available at http://www.aaup.org/publications/Academe/2002/02nd/02ndffr.htm. 
 239. Scholars suggest that Pickering and Connick are not applicable to curriculum 
decisions for other reasons as well.  See Buss, supra note 17, at 239 (“Applying the 
Pickering-Connick test to the teacher in the classroom as the communicator of a 
curriculum to students is a classic example of trying to use a tool designed for one 
purpose in the performance of an entirely different task and one for which it is not 
suited.”). 
 240. See Moshman, supra note 86, at 29 (arguing that although the First 
Amendment does not forbid government entities from imposing their viewpoint on 
curricula choice, narrow specification of what curricula a teacher may teach may 
prove detrimental to the quality of education).  Academic employment contracts 
often include protection for professor speech.  See, e.g., Greene v. Howard Univ., 412 
F.2d 1128, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (holding that the faculty handbook guides the 
faculty/university relationship); see also Jim Jackson, Express and Implied Contractual 
Rights to Academic Freedom in the United States, 22 HAMLINE L. REV. 467, 498 (1999) 
(arguing that academic freedom is a legal concept with bases in contract and 
constitutional law which empower the traditions of universities in America).  
Through an employment contract, universities may grant a broader academic 
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university professors are different from other government employees, 
however, it is difficult to argue that a constricted specification of what 
a university professor can teach really poses a First Amendment 
threat.241  Rather, narrow curriculum guidelines most likely endanger 
university students’ First Amendment rights, as discussed previously.242  
There is debate as to whether professors have academic freedom 
rights even against their universities,243 leaving it unlikely that 
professors have rights against state legislatures in matters of 
curriculum.  Thus, professorial academic freedom provides the least 
support for the argument that legislatures cannot determine 
university curriculum.  Yet the Urofsky court, while denying rights to 
professors, recognized that “subjects of faculty research [are] in the 
hands of the institution,”244 implying that if the university agrees with 
professors’ choices, the professors likely have First Amendment 
protection.  Because the freedom of speech of professors is naturally 
intertwined with the academic freedom of the university when it 
comes to matters of curriculum, the First Amendment likely protects 
professorial freedom to create curriculum as long as universities 
support their curriculum decisions. 
                                                          
freedom for professors than what the Constitution seems to provide.  In addition, 
scholars argue that it is more difficult to fire tenured professors for controversial 
speech in class, in writing, and in public.  See Ralph S. Brown & Jordan E. Kurland, 
Academic Tenure and Academic Freedom, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 325, 328 (1990).  
Although none of the cases mentioned in the Introduction resulted in the dismissal 
of professors, it is foreseeable that legislative pressure (through funding or 
otherwise) on a university could result in dismissal.  The 1973 Commission on 
Academic Tenure suggests that dismissal can occur only when there is (1) proven 
dishonesty or ineptitude, (2) significant disregard for duty, and (3) personal conduct 
that prevents a professor from performing her duties of employment.  Id. (citing 
COMMISSION ON ACADEMIC TENURE IN HIGHER EDUCATION, FACULTY TENURE 75 
(1973)).  However, employment contracts are created by and subject to state law, so 
this argument will likely fail. 
 241. Universities basically have the authority to restrict curriculum decisions by 
professors.  See Moshman, supra note 86, at 29; see, e.g., Edwards v. Cal. Univ. of 
Penn., 156 F.3d 488, 491 (3d Cir. 1998) (concluding that the First Amendment 
grants the university, and not the professor, the academic freedom to decide “what 
will be taught in the classroom”). 
 242. See supra Part II.B. 
 243. See Rossi, supra note 200, at 719, 731 (indicating that public universities have 
extensive authority to restrict professor speech and that academic freedom “is a 
doctrine with no clear definition”).  But see Buss, supra note 17, at 237 (suggesting 
that if extended to teachers, the Hazelwood test might offer some degree of 
protection for teacher speech regarding debate about the curriculum).  Buss reasons 
that protection probably exists as long as the acting party is attempting to suppress 
controversial ideas and is not just acting to preserve its educational objectives.  Id. 
 244. Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 415 n.17 (4th Cir. 2000). 
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III. RECOMMENDATION:  LEGISLATURES SHOULD STAY OUT OF 
UNIVERSITY CLASSROOMS 
This Comment seeks to discover whether public universities have 
any rights in matters of curriculum choice against the legislatures 
responsible for their creation and funding.  The notion that the First 
Amendment protects public universities’ freedom to select curricula 
assumes that a university, as a state actor, “has constitutional rights 
enforceable against its creator and paymaster.”245  If universities and 
students do have rights under the First Amendment, these rights 
trump the state legislatures’ authority to establish curricula in public 
universities because of the Supremacy Clause.246 
There are some possible arguments universities can make if they 
do have a First Amendment right to challenge attempts by the 
legislature to control university curricula.  First, there is a distinction 
between permissible content discrimination to preserve the purposes 
of the government-created institution and impermissible viewpoint 
discrimination targeted at speech considered to be within the 
limitations of the institution.247  As this Comment explains, there are 
strong arguments that universities have some rights against state 
legislatures to make internal decisions, including curriculum 
determination.  When state legislatures dictate what courses 
universities may offer, legislatures are impermissibly discriminating 
based upon viewpoint248 because states are not allowed to 
“discriminate invidiously . . . in such a way as to aim at the 
suppression of dangerous ideas.”249 
Second, the universities could argue that since Lawrence v. Texas250 
overturned Bowers v. Hardwick,251 courts may be less willing to allow 
states to legislate morality.252  The Lawrence Court referenced how 
                                                          
 245. See Metzger, supra note 18, at 1318.  However, a state-created entity, such as a 
university, can have rights that go beyond the control of its creator. 
 246. U.S. CONST. art. VI., cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United 
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the Supreme Law of the 
Land . . . .”). 
 247. See Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819, 829-32 (1995) (applying this 
distinction to hold that the denial of funding to a Christian student newspaper 
amounted to viewpoint discrimination). 
 248. Id. at 830 (“[I]deologically driven attempts to suppress a particular point of 
view are presumptively unconstitutional in funding, as in other contexts.”). 
 249. Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 548 
(1983). 
 250. 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (finding state laws that criminalize sodomy to be in 
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 251. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 252. The Lawrence Court explained that United States laws “afford constitutional 
protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, 
family relationships, child rearing, and education.”  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574.  
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other nations have affirmed the “right of homosexual adults to 
engage in intimate, consensual conduct.”253  Perhaps universities 
could use this change in perception to argue that there is no 
legitimate governmental purpose in forbidding discussion and 
education on this issue as well. 
This Comment recommends that legislatures refrain from 
interfering with university curriculum decisions.  The Supreme Court 
has recognized that educational decisions are better left to 
educational experts,254 and by insulating the universities from 
legislative interference,255 it becomes more likely that decisions will be 
based on educational rather than political concerns.  In the recent 
examples, it appears that the legislatures are mistaking “study for 
advocacy”256 and are too willing to argue that offering a course on a 
controversial topic such as homosexuality means the same thing as 
condoning it.257  Yet there are already safeguards in place:  students 
can “vote with their feet” and not enroll in courses they disagree with, 
and university curriculum review boards can continue to monitor the 
                                                          
Further, “[b]eliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood 
were they formed under compulsion of the State.”  Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood 
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)). 
 253. Id. at 576 (explaining that the European Court of Human Rights discounted 
Bowers and its reasoning). 
 254. See Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 (1985) (quoting 
Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz 435 U.S. 78, 90 (1978)) (emphasizing 
that curriculum decisions require “an expert evaluation of cumulative information 
and [are] not readily adapted to the procedural tools of judicial or administrative 
decision-making”). 
 255. See Burgan, supra note 14 (arguing these actions “insert politicians into 
administration of a university by using the power of the purse to censor the 
curriculum”). 
 256. See Smith, supra note 12 (examining the actions of the North Carolina House 
of Representatives, which proposed a state budget bill that denies funding to 
academic courses that emphasize religion unless all religions ere represented in an 
equal manner); see also Morris Sullivan, Trampling the Last Taboo, IMPACT PRESS, June-
July 2002 (pointing out that just because a university professor studies and teaches 
about fascism does not mean that she is a fascist), at http:// 
impactpress.com/articles/junjul02/mirkin6702.html (on file with the American 
University Law Review); James North, American Higher Education:   Once a Success Story, 
in ACADEMIC FREEDOM 3:   EDUCATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 191, 200-01 (John Daniel et 
al. eds., 1995) (“Nor have the conservatives tried to explain why surveys show that 
most American college students remain moderate, indeed more conservative than 
their predecessors back in the 1960s and 1970s, despite the brainwashing they are 
supposed to be undergoing.”). 
 257. In the North Carolina example, the legislature accused the University of 
advocating for Islam simply because the University assigned a book about the Qur’an 
for incoming freshmen.  See supra note 10; see also Kristen Brustad, Academic Freedom 
Under Attack (Sept. 24, 2002) (arguing that the recent trend reflects “a growing 
misconception that college education should not entail introducing students to 
anything that challenges their basic beliefs”), available at http://www.emory.edu/ 
ACAD_EXCHANGE/2003/febmar/brustad.html. 
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curricula.258  Rather than asking whether taxpayers should be paying 
to support courses they do not agree with, the question should be 
whether taxpayers should be paying to support the free exchange of 
ideas. 
CONCLUSION 
Upon assessing the ability of a state legislature to interfere with 
university matters in 1896, one judge questioned, “[w]hat 
permanency would there be in an institution thus subject to the 
caprice and will of every legislature?”259  There are a multitude of 
reasons why state legislatures may not disregard the traditionally 
understood institutional functions of public universities260 and why 
they are constrained by the First Amendment to defer to the 
expressive purposes that have always been linked to universities.261  
Foremost, the arguments for state control of publicly-funded 
institutions are distinguishable because universities are unique to 
other publicly-funded institutions.  In addition, Grutter v. Bollinger and 
other cases demonstrate that courts increasingly defer under the First 
Amendment to internal university decisions, which likely includes 
curriculum decisions.  Underlying this issue is also the reality that 
courts recognize the importance and advantages of protecting and 
promoting diversity in universities.262  For these reasons, state 
legislatures must not decide higher education curricula. 
 
                                                          
 258. See Scott, supra note 238 (noting that at the University of California Berkeley, 
undergraduate students can choose which writing seminar to enroll in based on 
course topic).  The University of California Berkeley also has a faculty committee 
dedicated to supervising all offered courses and curricula.  Id. 
 259. Sterling v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 68 N.W. 253, 257 (Mich. 1896) 
(concluding that the framers of the 1850 constitution meant to create a system that 
promoted excellence through the insulation of the governance of the university). 
 260. See Rabban, supra note 15, at 276 (arguing that state legislatures probably 
could not suddenly declare that universities were to be maintained solely for value 
inculcation rather than for critical inquiry). 
 261. Id. at 278. 
 262. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333-34 (2003) (“These benefits are not 
theoretical but real . . . the skills needed in today’s increasingly global marketplace 
can only be developed through exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, 
and viewpoints.”). 
